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“My heart aches as if it were not mine” 
- Fernando Pessoa, The Book of Disquiet  
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5 
Abstract 
 
Understandings and usages of empathy have long been contested between different 
schools of the psychoanalytic tradition; empathy has been constructed as a form of 
projective identification, a means of healing narcissistic injury, and a defence against 
otherness. As teachings and practices from Buddhism have become increasingly 
integrated into Western therapeutic approaches, the practice of mindfulness may be 
informing how therapists experience and make sense of empathy. In exploring how 
mindfulness practitioners construct the process of empathy within the therapeutic 
relationship, this study aims to address some of the gaps in current understanding. 14 
therapists who practiced mindfulness were interviewed about their empathic 
experiences, and the data was analysed using a social constructionist grounded theory 
methodology. The grounded theory constructed from the data suggested two categories 
involved in the process of empathy: Defending a fragile self and Trembling with the 
other. Defending a fragile self was constructed as an identification with an empathic 
ideal and a struggle to remain separate, while Trembling with the other was 
characterised by participants acknowledging their own lack, realising 
interconnectedness and being willing to meet the unknown. The implications for 
therapists’ practice regarding the therapeutic relationship are discussed, as are some 
considerations regarding counselling psychology research more generally. 
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Introduction 
 
Empathy occupies an uneasy place in the theory and practice of psychotherapy. 
Ensconced at the heart of some traditions yet rejected by others, the construct of 
empathy has been both glorified and denigrated; furthermore, different theorists 
emphasise different aspects of empathy, situating it in the broader context of their 
particular understandings of human experience. Epistemologically, I see meaning as 
socially constructed, located in the discourses between people; through considering the 
subject of empathy from a variety of perspectives within the psychoanalytic tradition I 
hope to encourage the reader to engage with this critical and contextual exploration 
rather than accepting any one definition at face value. No doubt some of these 
perspectives and ways of defining empathy will appeal more or less than others, and I 
hope that this in itself will prove illustrative of how thinking about empathy has the 
capacity to arouse strong responses of many kinds. 
In reviewing the extensive literature on empathy I have chosen to focus on 
psychoanalytic theory, excluding many contributions from other psychotherapeutic 
traditions. Empathy is one of the cornerstones of the humanistic school (e.g. Rogers, 
1961), and yet I’ve chosen not to draw from this approach here. As the field of theory 
and research on empathy is so extensive, a degree of focus is required. I speak of 
psychoanalysis because it speaks to me; my own clinical work and interests are largely 
rooted in psychoanalytic theory. I wanted to offer a well-rounded and informed review 
of the conflicts surrounding empathy in this one particularly rich tradition and to be able 
to explore to a reasonable degree of depth its complex positions and theories. Taking a 
broader perspective to include other therapeutic approaches would have diluted my 
capacity to do this.  
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Empathy has been constructed in very different ways since Freud’s (1921/1955) 
use of the word Einfühlung to indicate the therapeutic stance necessary for coming into 
relationship with another mind. The British object-relations school conceptualised 
empathy as a form of projective identification (e.g. Hinshelwood, 1989): a projecting of 
the self into the other, which in its original manifestation was thought to be one of the 
most regressive and dangerous forms of defence. Kohut (1984), father of the American 
school of self psychology, advocated an empathic stance in therapists as the means to 
heal early experiences of empathic failure. However, for the post-structural French 
psychoanalyst Lacan (1955/2006), empathy was a vicious “connivance” (p.282) that 
threatened to sabotage the therapy. More recently relational psychoanalysts have 
constructed empathy as an intersubjective process (Agosta, 1984) in which the unique 
contribution of the therapist is acknowledged and thought about. 
As noted by Grant and Harari (2011), many important psychoanalytic figures did 
not explicitly theorise about empathy, instead choosing to formulate related concepts, 
such as reverie, the processing of the patient’s difficult experiences (Bion, 1962); 
mirroring, the reflecting of the patient back to themselves (Winnicott, 1971); and 
countertransference, the patient’s unconscious communications (e.g. Heimann, 1950). 
These therapeutic concepts further developed the construct of empathy, offering 
therapists new ways of making sense of their relationships with their clients.  
Empathy has featured significantly in quantitative studies on the therapeutic 
relationship (e.g. Lambert & Barley, 2001) and neuroscientific research has identified 
brain regions associated with empathy (e.g. Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi, & Rizzolatti, 
1996). There is however a gap in the literature regarding in-depth qualitative 
explorations of the empathic experiences of therapists and how they construct the 
process of empathy. 
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Buddhist teachings and practices introduced to the West (e.g. Hanh, 1975; 
Suzuki, 1970) have developed into the movement of mindfulness that has increasingly 
been integrated into psychological therapy (e.g. Kabat-Zinn, 1990). Mindfulness is 
rooted in teachings and practices which emphasise ethical action and the cultivation of 
wisdom and compassion (M. Batchelor, 1999). Mindful awareness imbued with 
profound doubt and enquiry encourages an engagement with what cannot be known, 
fostering an empathy that is a “trembling along with” the other (Keown, 2003, p.15). 
While several quantitative studies have made claims that practicing mindfulness results 
in an increase in empathy (e.g. Shapiro, Schwartz, & Bonner, 1998), qualitative 
explorations are relatively lacking. 
While psychoanalysis has been instrumental in developing understandings of 
how the self gets constructed (e.g. Kohut, 1984), mindfulness is infused with the 
Buddhist perception that the self is an illusion responsible for all suffering (Rahula, 
1959). The interaction between these two traditions offers the opportunity for new 
constructions of empathy to develop.  
There is at present a gap in the literature in terms of qualitative explorations of 
therapists’ constructions of empathy, and more specifically the constructions of 
therapists with a mindfulness practice. This study aims to address these gaps by looking 
at how mindfulness practitioners construct the process of empathy within the 
therapeutic relationship. I hope that this exploration will create new opportunities to 
make sense of empathy and in doing so challenge the dominant discourses around what 
it means to empathise.  
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Literature Review 
 
Psychoanalytic constructions of empathy 
Freud used the word Einfühlung, which was translated in some instances by Strachey as 
“sympathetic understanding” (Freud, 1913/1962, p.140), and in others as “empathy” 
(Freud 1921/1955, p.110) to indicate the non-moralising attitude that plays “the largest 
part in our understanding of what is inherently foreign to our ego in other people” 
(Freud 1921/1955, p.66). Although it was not a subject on which he wrote prolifically, 
Freud (1921/1955) attempted to formulate Einfühlung as a meaningful concept with his 
suggestion that, “A path leads from identification by way of imitation to empathy, that 
is, to the comprehension of the mechanism by means of which we are enabled to take up 
any attitude at all towards another mental life” (p.110). This construction emphasises 
the role of identification in the process of attempting to understand, or even form any 
kind of relationship, with the experience of another person.  
The idea of empathy as an identification with the other was taken up in different 
ways by Freud’s followers. Melanie Klein (1952) developed the concept of projective 
identification to describe a primitive defence mechanism whereby the individual splits 
off “bad” and “good” aspects of their experience while at the same time attributing 
those qualities to other people in their life. Projective identification is a powerful 
concept for understanding the communications that develop in therapy, and provides a 
mechanism through which the self is experienced in the other. However, this may not be 
solely relevant to states of infantile regression, and indeed Klein (1955/1997) went on to 
say that “the projective mechanism underlying empathy is familiar in everyday life” 
(p.142). This suggests that empathy is possible through projecting a part of the self into 
another, in order to understand their inner experience as if from within. Building on 
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Klein’s ideas, Hinshelwood (1989) posits that loving relationships can transform the 
defence mechanism of projective identification into a benign form. Torres de Beà 
(1989) goes as far as stating that projective identification is the single most important 
mechanism in all human interaction, from the disturbed and pathological to the healthy 
and empathic. 
Psychoanalysts Wilfred Bion and Donald Winnicott also introduced radical 
ideas that have influenced understandings of empathy. Bion (1959/1988) argued that 
split-off and projected fragments of the infant’s experience must be received and 
contained by a mother who is resilient enough to survive this process without being 
overly damaged. Reverie was Bion’s (1962) term for the mother’s process of taking in 
and making sense of their infant’s projective identifications. This differs from 
traditional concepts of empathy, in that the mother does not so much feel what the infant 
is feeling, but instead is open to receiving and tolerating that which the infant 
experiences as overwhelmingly toxic. Thus it was surviving the impact of the infant’s 
projective identifications that Bion believed to be crucial in mothering, and by 
extension, therapy. Winnicott (1971) also emphasised the mother’s role in their infant’s 
psychic development through his concept of the “good-enough mother” (p.10): the 
mother that reflects the infant back to themselves, rather than just conveying their own 
mood. This mirroring results in the infant’s projective identifications gradually 
decreasing in intensity as the infant matures and develops the capacity to meet their own 
needs for mirroring. Winnicott suggested that when the mother is able to generally 
satisfy her infant’s needs in this way, the infant will develop a sense of a real self.  If the 
mother is unable to provide their infant with adequate acknowledgement and validation, 
Winnicott (1960) suggested that a “false self” (p.148) would develop. This might be 
organised, for example, around a sense of specialness based on achievement, or in other 
cases, through symbiotically merging with the other (Johnson, 1994). 
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 The concept of countertransference is also linked to psychoanalytic 
understandings of empathy. Originally conceived of by Freud (1910/1957) as a 
dangerous manifestation of the therapist’s unresolved conflicts that get triggered by the 
transference, countertransference in contemporary relational psychotherapy is now 
generally understood to be a universal phenomenon that is co-constructed in the 
therapeutic relationship by both therapist and client (Mitchell, 1993). At any given time 
a therapist might feel hate, envy, fear, boredom or any other emotion in relation to their 
client; this response can be understood at least in part as an unconscious communication 
from the client. Through the therapist’s awareness and processing of this 
countertransference response, the client can become more aware of their own relational 
patterns that might be causing them suffering (e.g. Heimann, 1950; Racker, 1957). 
Tansey and Burke (1989) express this through their assertion that “empathy is the 
outcome of a radically, mutual interactive process between patient and therapist” 
(p.195) whereby the therapist’s role is to process the countertransference responses that 
get evoked in the therapeutic relationship.  
Heinz Kohut’s self psychology (e.g. 1984) placed a great deal of importance on 
the therapist’s capacity to communicate their empathic understanding to the patient in 
an experience-near manner; he argued that empathy is the means through which a 
therapist could come to know their patient’s unmet developmental needs. Kohut (1984) 
defined empathy as “The capacity to think and feel oneself into the inner life of another 
person” (p.78), which he suggested was key in treating patients with narcissistic issues. 
This was a controversial position to take in the contemporary psychoanalytic landscape, 
stimulating vociferous challenges (e.g. Brenner, 1968). Kohut formulated a series of 
narcissistic needs (1984) which he argued must be met for the child to develop a stable 
sense of self. These included the need to feel understood and valued by the parent, and 
the need to believe that the parent is powerful, good and wise. Kohut argued that if these 
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childhood needs went unmet, they could exert powerful unconscious effects on the 
person, causing them problems in future relationships. Kohut found that these needs 
would surface in the therapeutic relationship through the emergence of the mirroring 
transference and the idealising transference, in which the patient sees the therapist as 
someone capable of valuing them for who they are, or as someone who can be looked 
up to. In this way the therapist becomes a “self-object” (Kohut, 1971/2009, p.25), an 
external person that serves an essential role in maintaining the patient’s functioning 
sense of self. Kohut (1984) argued that the therapist’s empathy provides the patient with 
the way of healing wounds from early experiences of not being understood or validated 
by their parents. The therapist takes the role of empathically interpreting the patient’s 
self-object needs within the context of the patient’s relational history, without 
attempting to disinvest the patient of their transferential attachment. Kohut (1971/2009) 
also emphasised the importance of the therapist’s empathic failures; as long as the 
failure was not catastrophic it could serve as an “optimal frustration” (p.49), a 
disappointment sufficiently tolerable as to offer the patient the opportunity to provide 
the empathy they need by and for themselves. Kohut (1971/2009) termed this process a 
“transmuting internalisation” (p.74), an assimilation of the therapist’s empathic 
presence, which was what he argued helped the patient to develop a cohesive sense of 
self. 
Building on the work of Kohut and the British object-relations school, relational 
psychoanalysts such as Merton Gill (e.g. 1984) and Stephen Mitchell (e.g. 1988) sought 
to emphasise the intersubjective nature of human interaction and to acknowledge the 
therapist’s unique contribution to the process of therapy. Psychoanalysis has steadily 
moved towards a two-person psychology (e.g. Balint, 1950; Spezzano, 1996), which 
like Sullivan’s (1953) construction of the participant-observer, highlights that no matter 
how much neutrality might be sought, it is inevitable that the therapist’s conscious 
13 
choices, intentions, beliefs and unconscious processes profoundly affect the work of 
therapy. This suggestion that therapists and their clients are not individuals but rather 
parts of an interdependent whole has important implications for how empathy is to be 
understood, emphasising interpersonal processes and a co-creation of meaning. Ogden 
(1994) writes that “From the point of view of the interdependence of subject and object, 
the analytic task involves an attempt to describe as fully as possible the specific nature 
of the experience of the interplay of individual subjectivity and intersubjectivity” (p.4). 
Ogden refers to this position of considering the interplay between subjectivity and 
intersubjectivity as a profoundly creative “analytic third” (p.3): a subject that takes on a 
life of its own in relation to the individual therapist and patient. 
In many ways empathy can be seen as the foundation of intersubjectivity, in that 
it is through empathy that the experience of being in relationship can be apprehended 
(Agosta, 1984). This places empathy in a prominent position as the faculty for 
understanding the complex interweaving of the client’s subjectivity with that of the 
therapist. Relational psychotherapist Michael Kahn (1997) suggests that empathy is 
most therapeutic when it is held in a particular way; “when the therapist can maintain or 
achieve an optimal distance from the feeling… that provides a felt understanding of the 
client but does not overwhelm the therapist” (p.139). This suggests a process of 
balancing between being too close to or too distant from the other’s experience, rather 
than simply observing from a supposedly neutral or objective perspective as might be 
advocated by a classically trained psychoanalyst. 
 
The Lacanian critique of empathy 
While the construct of empathy has been theorised and its importance emphasised to 
varying degrees in different psychoanalytic traditions, in other quarters it has been more 
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radically challenged. French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan (1949/2006) suggested that 
the need for empathy has its origins in a particular stage of infancy, which he referred to 
as the mirror phase. Lacan argued that the infant is confronted with a painful and 
chaotic experience of its own un-coordinated and fragmented bodily experience; in 
response to this, the infant develops a sense of self through seeing its own reflected 
image, either through a looking glass or in the imitations of caregivers or peers, thus 
gaining a degree of control over their body. For Lacan, empathy involved seeing the self 
reflected in the other; identifying with the mirror image enables a denial of the bodily 
experience of fragmentation and lack. This intangible sense of lack, of there being 
something missing, was for Lacan (1954-1955/1991) the source of all human desire. 
Lacan (1949/2006) argued that empathy was an identification based on illusion which 
could only perpetuate a sense of alienation. This suggests that any attempt by the 
therapist to offer empathy to the patient will only alienate them further from themselves 
and their surroundings. Lacan (1955/2006) suggested that a therapist attempting to 
provide their patient with empathy was engaging in a form of “connivance” (p.282): a 
refusal to acknowledge the otherness of the patient, which Lacan argued inexcusably 
undermined the analytic process. Parker (2003), a Lacanian analyst, asserts that “The 
attainment of empathy serves to sabotage what is most radical about psychoanalysis, for 
the sense that one has empathised with another serves to make them the same as 
oneself… Against this reduction to the level of ‘imaginary’ identification, the task of the 
Lacanian psychoanalyst is ‘to obtain absolute difference’” (p.58). Some Lacanians (e.g. 
Safouan, 1980) went so far as to suggest that through empathy the analyst is actually 
gazing upon their own self-image as reflected back to them through their patient.  
 In opposition to the “connivance” of empathy, Lacan presented a therapeutic 
approach which emphasised the importance of language. Lacan (1955-56/2006) argued 
that the function of language is to introduce a symbolic order to a person’s experience; 
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this provides a structure to organise every aspect of a person’s experience of themselves 
and their world, a process which is largely unconscious. In carefully attending to the 
patient’s speech as a way of understanding their unconscious desires, Lacan argued that 
therapy can help the patient to find a meaningful place for themselves within the world. 
Emphasising the symbolic over the imaginary, language over empathy, was one of 
Lacan’s most significant contributions to psychoanalysis, warning us to be sceptical of 
identifying with our patients and urging us to really listen to their discourse. 
 
Research findings on empathy 
While observations from clinical practice form the bulk of psychoanalytic enquiries into 
empathy, most psychological research has approached empathy using quantitative 
methods. Much of the quantitative research evidence has focused on exploring empathy 
as a mechanism of therapeutic change. The therapeutic relationship, of which empathy 
is a part, has been constructed as the common factor in all psychotherapy treatments and 
the one most capable of predicting client outcome (e.g. Lambert & Barley, 2001). Much 
of the research on empathy attempts to quantify what impact therapist empathy has on 
client outcome. For example, in a meta-analysis of 47 studies, Bohart, Elliott, 
Greenberg, and Watson (2002) found that measures of therapist empathy were 
positively correlated with measures of client outcome, a result that was broadly 
supported by a more recent meta-analysis (Elliott, Watson, Bohart, & Greenberg, 2011). 
Most of the studies included in these meta-analyses used measurement scales that claim 
to quantify empathy; for example, the Barrett-Lennard Relationship Inventory empathy 
scale (Hill, Nutt, & Jackson, 1994) is a client-rated measure of therapist empathy, 
developed in accord with person-centred understandings of empathy. Neuroscientific 
research over the past two decades has focused on establishing a neurological basis for 
empathy; the “mirror neuron circuit” (Gallese et al., 1996) has been identified as a 
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potential set of brain areas responsible for co-coordinating a process of simulating the 
experience of another, with supporting evidence coming from studies using methods of 
fMRI (e.g. Wicker et al., 2003) and TMS (e.g. Pascual-Leone, Walsh, & Rothwell, 
2000). 
Research on empathy is a vast field, and I have had to be very selective over my 
choice of what to include in my review of the literature. I have chosen not to devote 
significant attention to the considerable body of quantitative research on empathy, 
because this section of the literature seems to have little to say about how empathy is 
subjectively experienced and understood. In addition, it is underpinned by positivist 
assumptions which are at odds with the principles of counselling psychology (e.g. 
Cooper, 2009) and which I largely reject. Hoffman (2009) suggests that much of 
evidence-based practice is unjustified epistemologically, as it fails to acknowledge the 
uniqueness of the encounter between specific individuals, and in doing so stunts 
creativity in the psychoanalytic profession. Likewise, Cushman and Gilford (2000) 
argue that research undertaken in order to build an evidence base is filled with 
“abhorrence of ambiguity, complexity, uncertainty, perplexity, mystery, imperfection, 
and individual variation in treatment” (p.993). Warren (2012) laments that the positivist 
attempt to eliminate the subjectivity of both researcher and participant is prized above 
other epistemological stances in the current socio-political climate, but reminds us that 
practically every major step forward in psychoanalytic practice has come from clinical 
observations, case studies and intellectual discourse rather than quantitative research. 
He goes on to suggest that “It is precisely this complex, elaborate, and also highly 
subjective and unique web of interconnected contexts that enables us to know what we 
know within the psychoanalytic situation” (p.136). Furthermore, as it is through 
subjectivity that all psychoanalytic understanding has been constructed, it is nonsensical 
to discard this perspective as irrelevant or unscientific. Warren argues that there is a 
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fundamental misunderstanding in the attempt to quantitatively measure meaningful 
dimensions of human experience in the context of a medical model that assumes the aim 
of psychotherapy is symptom reduction. This approach ignores specific factors to the 
individual such as their particular history and immersion in language and culture. The 
use of measurement scales (e.g. Hill et al., 1994) and neuroscientific methods (e.g. 
Wicker et al., 2003) in empathy research strike me as a defence against ambiguity, and 
an attempt to eliminate the uniqueness of the therapeutic relationship while ignoring the 
context in which that relationship takes place. 
Qualitative research on how empathy is constructed or experienced by therapists 
is scarce. In a phenomenological study of medical students’ understandings of empathy, 
Tavakol, Dennick, and Tavakol (2012) constructed the following themes: trying to 
imagine the other’s experience without losing objectivity; being willing to communicate 
empathy to the patient; believing that empathy is innate; and a gradual shifting to a 
more intellectual rather than affective form of empathy due to work pressures. Using a 
variation of interpretative phenomenological analysis to explore empathy via 
psychological type theory, Churchill and Bayne (2001) found that counsellors who fit 
into different categories of psychological types understood empathy in different ways. 
For example, counsellors of a “feeling type” were more likely to talk about empathy in 
terms of their own emotions than counsellors of a “thinking type” who seemed to 
construct empathy as more about summarising the content of the client’s 
communications. Myers and White (2012) used content analysis to draw parallels 
between empathy in the therapeutic relationship and musicians’ relationships with each 
other. Through interviewing professional musicians, the authors constructed themes of 
striking a chord, staying in tune and making music. They likened these themes 
respectively to various aspects of therapy: forming an empathic connection, maintaining 
a working relationship, and the therapeutic process of having intimate and spiritual 
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experiences of a transformative nature. Clearly there is a major gap in the literature 
regarding in-depth explorations of the empathic experiences of therapists, an interesting 
point to note in comparison to the extensive quantitative “evidence base”. 
 
Mindfulness and empathy 
Freud (1930/1961) was sceptical about practices derived from Eastern religion, 
describing meditation experiences as “the oceanic feeling” and a “limitless narcissism” 
(p.72). This suggestion that meditation cultivates an infantile fantasy of merging has 
been taken up and challenged in subsequent years as Buddhist texts became translated 
into English, and Western travellers to the East started bringing their experiences of 
meditation training back to their homelands. Of all Buddhist teaching, it is mindfulness 
that has most fully taken root in the West, coming to be defined as “Paying attention in 
a particular way: on purpose, in the present and non-judgmentally” (Kabat-Zinn, 1994, 
p.4). Originally outlined in the sutta entitled “The Foundations of Mindfulness” 
(Majjhima Nikāya 10: Satipaṭṭhāna-sutta), the Buddha gives instruction to his Bhikkhus, 
or monks, on the practice of mindfulness: finding a quiet place, sitting down with the 
legs crossed and the back straight, and bringing mindful awareness to the experience of 
breathing. He advises this practice as a way of observing the activities of the body and 
mind, and how the nature of this activity is to arise and cease. Through bringing 
awareness to the ongoing flux of thought and sensation, the Buddha reflects that this 
practice cultivates awareness of impermanence: an embodied understanding that we all 
age, get sick and die. This is perhaps considered to be at the heart of mindfulness 
practice.  
 Mindfulness is now often practiced in a secular form that can have applications 
outside a religious context (e.g. S. Batchelor, 1997), while attempting to retain an 
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underpinning of awareness and insight into the true nature of reality (Gunaratana, 2002). 
Interest in mindfulness as a therapy is increasing rapidly, with new approaches 
emerging that are either directly based on its practices (e.g. Mindfulness-Based Stress 
Reduction [MBSR], Kabat-Zinn, 1990); or informed by its philosophy and precepts 
(e.g. Acceptance and Commitment Therapy, Hayes & Smith, 2005). Research on MBSR 
in particular (e.g. Baer, 2003) has led to its becoming increasingly perceived as an 
“evidence-based” therapy in Western society. This has resulted in the promotion of 
mindfulness as a treatment for certain symptoms or diagnoses, and an attempt to 
measure change using outcome measures: an approach that has its critics (e.g. Moss, 
Waugh & Barnes, 2008; Bazzano, 2015). Mindfulness is also an integral part of several 
psychotherapy trainings, including Core-Process (Sills, 2009) and Hakomi (Kurtz, 
1990) psychotherapies. Various psychotherapists from different traditions have written 
about their attempts to bring together and integrate Western psychotherapeutic concepts 
and practices with those from Buddhism (e.g. Epstein, 1995; Welwood, 2000).  
It is important to acknowledge the inextricable intertwining of empathy and 
ethical action in the context of Buddhism. Indeed, some of the Buddha’s teaching as 
documented in the Pali canon uses empathy as the foundation for ethical behaviour: 
“All tremble at violence; all fear death. Putting oneself in the place of another, one 
should not kill nor cause another to kill.”  (The Dhammapada 10:129, emphasis added). 
The Buddhist ethic is rooted less in morality, the judgement of right and wrong, and 
more in terms of acting with the intention of reducing suffering for self and others 
through wisdom and compassion (M. Batchelor, 1999).  
Ethics in Buddhist practice can be cultivated in different ways. One method is 
through adhering to and internalising a set of precepts or guidelines, such as refraining 
from causing harm through action or speech (e.g. M. Batchelor, 1999). These precepts 
may be taken by monks or laypeople, and are usually established not just in Buddhist 
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temples or monasteries but also in retreat centres in the West. Another approach is to 
incline the mind and body towards states associated with ethical action. In this case, the 
Brahma-vihāras, sometimes translated as the four Sublime States (Rahula, 1959), might 
be used as objects of meditation with the aim of cultivating empathy (Morgan & 
Morgan, 2005). These four states are mettā, the extension of unlimited and universal 
loving-kindness, karunā, compassion for all living beings who suffer, muditā, 
sympathetic joy in the success, happiness and wellbeing of others, and upekkhā, 
equanimity in the face of whatever may arise (Rahula, 1959). Bien (2008) explores each 
of these in terms of their relevance to the therapeutic relationship, arguing that the 
cultivation of the Brahma-vihāras can be an approach to developing therapeutic 
presence. For example, he suggests that the quality of equanimity can help the therapist 
empathise with the client without becoming overwhelmed. 
 The Pali word anukampa is often loosely translated as empathy, and more 
specifically as a “trembling along with” the experience of the other (Keown, 2003, 
p.15). It is this empathy that is stated in the Pali Canon to be the Buddha’s motivation in 
deciding to offer his teaching to the world (Aṅguttara Nikāya 1). This empathic 
trembling is linked with an attitude of enquiry and a cultivation of doubt. In his book 
‘The Faith to Doubt’, former monk in the Korean Zen tradition Stephen Batchelor 
(1990) asserts that “The way of the Buddha is a living response to a living question” 
(p.3). Rather than providing a coherent and articulate answer, Batchelor argues that 
meditation necessitates engagement with profound existential doubt, and that to shirk 
this through adhering to dogma is to miss out on opportunities for insight. This speaks 
to the traditional Zen maxim, as quoted in M. Batchelor (1999, p.16): 
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“Great doubt: great awakening. 
Little doubt: little awakening. 
No doubt: no awakening.” 
 
S. Batchelor (1990) makes the distinction between questioning in a calculative manner, 
which uses techniques to achieve a desired outcome or solve a problem, and a 
meditative approach to questioning, which is characterised by waiting and listening 
without expectation “in the simplicity of unknowing” (p.49). Batchelor describes his 
years in a Korean monastery practicing with the koan, “What is this?” as a way of 
getting in touch with profound existential doubt. He emphasises that it is not the words 
of the question that are particularly important, but rather the physical sense of perplexity 
that they induce. Batchelor articulates an inextricable involvement in life, in which the 
distinction between the questioner and the question is lost, and a sense of 
interconnectedness pervades. This is akin to Zen master Shunryu Suzuki’s (1970) 
assertion that “In the beginner’s mind there are many possibilities, but in the expert’s 
mind there are few” (p.21). Such an attitude of openness towards the unknown suggests 
that meditation practice would cultivate an empathy founded on doubt and mystery. 
 
Research findings on mindfulness and empathy 
The majority of research on mindfulness and empathy has used quantitative methods, 
and is largely rooted in positivist assumptions, limiting its relevance for this study. 
However, I mention some briefly, as while I may disagree with the epistemological 
premises on which these studies rest, they generated ideas that led to the development of 
this piece of research.  
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 In a quantitative study, medical students who participated in an eight-week 
MBSR course self-reported an increase in empathy that was statistically greater than 
that of a control group (Shapiro et al., 1998). Similarly, a within-subjects study 
conducted by Lesh (1970) suggested that a four-week training in Zen meditation 
increased empathy in counselling psychology students, and that participants with 
initially low capacities for empathy attained the greatest gains. Studies conducted by 
Paul Ekman (reported in Goleman, 2003) suggest that Buddhist monks are significantly 
more accurate in detecting small changes in facial expressions of emotion than many 
other groups considered to be expert at emotion detection (including secret service 
agents). 
 In a book chapter entitled ‘Meditation for Cultivating Empathy’, Shapiro and 
Izett (2008) propose three potential mechanisms through which mindfulness might 
cultivate empathy. Firstly, that mindfulness has been shown to reduce stress which 
otherwise has a detrimental impact on empathy (Galantino, Baime, Maguire, Szapary, & 
Farrar, 2005); secondly, that mindfulness increases self-compassion (Shapiro, Brown, & 
Biegel, 2007) which is associated with increased compassion for others; and thirdly, that 
mindfulness develops the capacity for shifting from one’s own perspective to take the 
perspective of another (Shapiro, Carlson, Astin, & Freedman, 2006).  
 Several qualitative studies have explored the link between mindfulness and 
empathy. In a grounded theory study, Bihari and Mullan (2014) interviewed individuals 
with a history of depression who had participated in an eight-week Mindfulness-Based 
Cognitive Therapy (MBCT) group. Findings suggested that following the group, 
participants experienced an increased tendency to “be with” rather than fix other people 
in distress. In a thematic analysis study, Hopkins and Proeve (2013) found that after 
undergoing training in mindfulness, trainee psychologists described a lessening of 
performance anxiety, a greater awareness of their own responses and an enhanced 
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capacity to communicate empathy towards their clients. In a mixed-methods study, 
Keane (2014) found that qualified therapists with an existing meditation practice 
believed that mindfulness cultivated their awareness, enabling them to meet their clients 
at greater depth. McCollum and Gehart (2010) used thematic analysis to analyse the 
diaries of trainee therapists over the period of time that they were being taught to 
practice mindfulness. Among other findings, they noted that participants brought 
together an awareness of their own inner experiences and an awareness of the client’s 
process, without becoming merged or overwhelmed. Cigolla and Brown (2011) used 
interpretative phenomenological analysis in a study exploring the experiences of 
therapists with a meditation practice. The researchers noted that these participants 
constructed mindfulness as a way of being that was characterised by awareness of 
relational processes, and a tolerance of the unknown and the distress of the client. In a 
study using grounded theory methods, Millon and Halewood (2015) explored the 
countertransference experiences of psychotherapists who engaged in a personal 
mindfulness practice. Findings indicated that participants believed meditation cultivated 
their capacity to let go of their own preoccupations and insecurities, and empathically 
enter into the world of another. Participants believed they were increasingly able to 
tolerate difficult countertransference responses, such as anger, fear or boredom, opening 
up the possibility of using these responses in the service of understanding their clients.  
 Most of these qualitative studies appear to be underpinned by a positivist 
epistemology, with some studies claiming to be social constructionist in approach 
arguably lacking in epistemological coherence (e.g. McCollum & Gehart, 2010). These 
studies appear to assume that participants’ accounts are objective, and thus claim that 
practicing mindfulness builds empathy. I would argue rather that these accounts must be 
read and interpreted as attempts to make meaning within a particular set of social 
conditions. To use these accounts merely to bolster the positivist assumptions that 
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empathy or illness can be measured is to squander something very valuable: the 
opportunity to understand how a person with a mindfulness practice constructs (or 
deconstructs) their experience of empathy.  
 
Constructions and deconstructions of self in psychoanalysis and mindfulness 
Exploring different ways of relating to the self is important in understanding how 
psychoanalysis and Buddhism construct the experience of empathy, challenging us to 
question where empathy gets located: in the individual, in the relationship between self 
and other, or as part of something else completely. Most psychoanalytic constructions of 
empathy seem to be rooted in the underlying assumption that there is a valid and 
enduring distinction between self and other (Orange, 2002). For example, the object-
relations perspective that empathy is a form of projective identification (e.g. 
Hinshelwood, 1989) suggests that the self is projected into the other, while self-
psychology is predicated on the idea of a self with needs for empathy that can be met or 
frustrated (e.g. Kohut, 1984). It is only more recently that the relational school moved 
away from this in order to focus on empathy as an intersubjective process (e.g. Agosta, 
1984). While psychoanalytic thinkers such as Winnicott (1960) have explored how the 
sense of self gets constructed, Buddhist teachings seek to deconstruct the assumption of 
a fixed self, suggesting that it is an illusion responsible for all suffering (Rahula, 1959).  
Bion (1962) struck a blow to the view of the self as a fixed and separate entity 
which can engage in various mental processes. He reversed the order, suggesting that it 
is the mind’s capacity to convert raw incoming sense data into thought that results in the 
emergence of a mind. Bion (1970) used the phrase “thoughts in search of a thinker” 
(p.105) suggesting that thinking precedes the sense of identity. For Bion, the capacity 
for thought and the resulting sense of a thinker come from an experience of relationship, 
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whether mother and infant or therapist and patient. The implication this has on empathy 
is that the sense of self arises from empathy, rather than the other way around. This 
seems to align with Kohut’s (1971/2009) suggestion that a cohesive self structure 
develops from the individual internalising the empathic presence of their care-givers. 
The assumption of a separation between self and other was notably challenged 
by Winnicott (1960), who argued that “there is no such thing as an infant” (p.39), 
meaning that it was impossible to theorise the infant’s early object-relations without 
understanding them as intrinsically linked to the maternal environment. Winnicott 
(1953) proposed an in-between space that is neither purely psychic, nor purely social. 
This transitional space is the domain of play and culture, allowing the individual to feel 
extremes of both hatred and love, and to move from a position of infantile omnipotence 
to a more mature relatedness in which others can be experienced as separate without 
entailing catastrophe. Transitional space has relevance when considering empathy, as it 
points to both the uneasy foundation on which distinctions between self and other are 
built, and the potential for creativity and transformation in navigating this paradoxical 
experience of “me” and “not-me”.  
 The experience of anatta, commonly translated as no-self (Rahula, 1959), 
informs much of the self-enquiry that is practiced through Buddhist meditation. Put 
simply, this is the perception that the concept of a permanent, fixed self is a powerful 
illusion that is responsible for much of human suffering, and that freedom or awakening 
occurs through loosening the attachment to this illusory self. Mindfulness meditation is 
a practice that often results in such a loosening, through identifying less with the 
continuous flow of thoughts, feelings and bodily sensation that pass through 
consciousness (Rosenbaum, 2009). This encourages the mediator to enquire deeply into 
the experience of a self-construct, questioning any belief in an “I” associated with one’s 
pains or joys. The 13th Century Japanese Zen Buddhist teacher Dogen elegantly 
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expresses the transformation that comes from letting go of this illusory self (as quoted in 
M. Batchelor, 1999, p.12): 
 
“The way of the Buddha 
Is to know yourself, 
To know yourself 
Is to forget yourself, 
To forget yourself 
Is to be enlightened by all things.” 
 
Essentially, relinquishing the self-construct is to realise that the individual, others and 
the world are interdependent and that the true nature of experience is emptiness and 
impermanence (Rahula, 1959). This may have implications for how empathy is 
constructed, suggesting that, on inspection, the self that empathises may be revealed to 
be nothing but an illusion. Writing about this illusory self-construct, Buddhist 
psychotherapist Mark Epstein (1995) suggests that “Self, it turns out, is a metaphor for a 
process that we do not understand, a metaphor for that which knows” (p.154). Epstein 
suggests that true freedom comes from letting go of the narcissistic thirst for an 
enduring self: a thinker behind the thoughts.  
Epstein (1995) links this practice of enquiring into the nature of self with 
Winnicott’s idea of transitional space (1953), suggesting that meditation cultivates a 
space that is in-between the subjective sense of the individual and the understanding of 
others existing with their own subjectivities. Meditation, he argues, builds the capacity 
to simultaneously experience the “me” and the “not-me”, a comfort in both separateness 
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and connection. This idea of residing in transitional space means a loosening of one’s 
identification with experience, a relinquishing of a firm boundary between self and 
other. With the perception of no-self comes a deep realisation of interconnectedness. If 
every being is dependent on an infinite number of other manifestations of life, and the 
self is simply an “unfolding narrative” (S. Batchelor, 1997, p.82) that emerges from this 
matrix of conditions, empathy becomes the only reasonable response. As Bien (2008) 
writes, “The practice of compassion is like the right hand taking care of the injured left 
hand: it is not a morally superior action, but simply the appropriate thing to do given the 
underlying unity of the body” (p.53). 
 
The present study  
In recent years mindfulness practice has increasingly been integrated with psychological 
therapy (e.g. Kabat-Zinn, 1990; Sills, 2009); as of yet we do not know how such a 
practice informs the way in which empathy is experienced and understood within the 
therapeutic relationship. In exploring how therapists with a mindfulness practice 
construct the process of empathy, this study aims to address some of these gaps in 
understanding, while undoubtedly raising further questions. 
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Methodology 
 
Design 
This is a qualitative study which utilises a social constructionist grounded theory 
methodology (Charmaz, 2006) and unstructured interviews to explore how therapists 
who practice mindfulness meditation construct the process of empathy within the 
therapeutic relationship.  
 
Rationale for qualitative methodology 
A qualitative methodology was chosen for this study in order to explore in-depth the 
subtleties of meaning and perspective (Willig, 2013) of therapists’ constructions of 
empathy in the therapeutic relationship. Qualitative methods offer the researcher 
flexibility to adapt the research process to fit with the developing constructions between 
researcher and participant (Charmaz, 2006), which I deemed to be invaluable in 
responding in the moment to the nuances of participants’ experiences. Working 
qualitatively is more suited to such a process than undertaking a quantitative study with 
the accompanying need for a-priori hypotheses and the collection of measurable data 
(Coolican, 2014). 
 Quantitative research studies have claimed that practicing mindfulness can 
increase empathy (e.g. Shapiro et al., 1998). However, such claims are rooted in 
positivist assumptions, such as the belief that it is possible to measure empathy, that 
empathy means the same thing to different people, and that mindfulness practice can be 
standardised. I fundamentally disagree with these premises and suggest that a social 
constructionist epistemological framework is appropriate in exploring the links between 
empathy and mindfulness to a greater depth. No qualitative research has been published 
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on how the process of empathy is constructed by therapists who maintain a regular 
personal practice of mindfulness meditation. 
 Research on therapy interventions is largely dominated by large-scale 
randomised-controlled trials, which are often necessary to bring new forms of therapy 
into mainstream acceptance by healthcare providers (Kendall, Pilling, Whittington, 
Pettinari, & Burbeck, 2005). These trials, with their positivistic assumptions, focus on 
outcome measures in order to generalise how effective a particular form of therapy is, 
and thus to judge the prudence of delivering this therapy on a widespread basis. 
Outcome-driven quantitative research may be useful in increasing secular confidence in 
the therapeutic benefits of mindfulness practice, allowing practitioners to introduce 
mindfulness into contexts where previously it may not have been given a chance. 
However, it could be argued that this type of research is quite fundamentally at odds 
with the ethos of mindfulness, which prizes uncertainty (S. Batchelor, 1990) and a non-
expert stance (Suzuki, 1970); as Bazzano (2015) suggests, “The teachings of the 
Buddha are subversive and the mindfulness ‘movement’ makes them palatable at great 
cost” (p.4). Qualitative methods, on the other hand, tend to invite a focus on process 
rather than outcome (Coolican, 2014) and mirror the complexities and nuances of the 
type of enquiry which characterises mindfulness practice. 
 
The epistemology of grounded theory 
Symbolic interactionism 
Emerging from symbolic interactionism in the field of sociology, grounded theory as 
originally conceptualised by Glaser and Strauss (1967) was revolutionary in its focus on 
generating theory from qualitative data. Grounded theory’s foundation is in symbolic 
interactionism which emphasises the interactive social processes that create shared 
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meanings throughout groups or communities (Kendall, 1999). The epistemological 
assumptions underlying these meanings have been challenged by subsequent 
generations of researchers using grounded theory methods, so that as an approach, 
grounded theory has been used by researchers with widely differing stances on what 
knowledge means. 
 
Post-positivism 
As concepts such as truth and reality face critical interrogation (Fay, 1985), the post-
positivist approach has emerged. Post-positivism acknowledges and adapts the methods 
of scientific research to falsify, rather than verify, hypotheses and uses more naturalistic 
settings than traditional positivistic research, while retaining the assumption that 
epistemological objectivity is possible and to be striven for (Lincoln, Lynham, & Guba, 
2011). Lapid (1989) argues that the post-positivist approach is characterised by an 
emphasis on meta-theoretical paradigms that encompass multi-layered models of 
knowledge, as opposed to isolated and self-contained theories; a focus on the 
perspective of the researcher and how assumptions and premises may impact on the 
process of developing scientific understanding; and a philosophical relativism which 
challenges embedded criteria for judging knowledge as legitimately scientific or not. 
 Classic grounded theory is rooted in post-positivistic assumptions about the 
potential for objective truth which can be discovered by the researcher, leading to 
theories that represent an underlying reality (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Traditionally 
allied with experimental, quantitative methods, grounded theory initially perhaps served 
as a bridge between more traditional epistemological positions of positivism and 
positions that value subjective experience and the nuances of shared meanings. 
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Constructivism and Social Constructionism 
More recent versions of grounded theory (Charmaz, 2006) challenge the post-
positivistic assumptions embedded within its original form (Glaser & Strauss, 1967), 
and adopt a constructivist or social constructionist approach. Constructivists argue that 
meaning is individually and privately constructed through cognitive processes (Rosen, 
1996). Social constructionist approaches by contrast emphasise the fundamentally 
relational way in which meanings are culturally constructed through social processes 
(Andrews, 2012). This results in a different perspective on where meaning is deemed to 
be located, as for the constructivists it is within the person and for social 
constructionists it is within the discourse between people (McNamee, 2004). Social 
constructionism thus places less value on the individualistic, private experiences of the 
self in isolation, and more emphasis on the relational processes, which may of course 
become internalised, as human beings interact with each other in the infinite ways 
which relationships invite. 
 Hosking (2011) suggests that her variation on social constructionism, relational 
constructionism, allows for a “soft” self-other differentiation. This paradigm 
acknowledges that the self-other distinction is constructed within a particular social 
context, varying in different cultures and historical periods, locating meaning in 
relationship, rather than in subject or object. McWilliams (2010) argues that social 
constructionism is highly compatible with the Buddhist perceptions of no-self and 
emptiness, as both paradigms refute the assumption that events or individuals have fixed 
meanings or identities but rather that they arise within a set of relational processes. This 
resonance between my epistemological stance and the practice I was researching helped 
generate new ideas and develop my understanding in unexpected directions. 
 Grounded theory has proved a natural fit with social constructionism, through 
acknowledging the researcher’s subjectivity in shaping and approaching the data while 
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exploring in-depth the implicit processes of meaning-making going on in the interaction 
between researcher and the researched (Charmaz, 2006). The researcher is assumed to 
have their own creative role in the interpretive process and is encouraged to take a 
reflexive stance to explore this process. 
 
Post-structuralism 
While my epistemological stance was social constructionist, I was also very interested 
in integrating ideas from post-structural theorists. This was partially because of my wish 
to challenge dominant discourses in our society that have been criticised for 
constructing empathy and mindfulness as both part of the medical model which reduces 
a person to a collection of symptoms (e.g. Bazzano, 2015), and as part of the pursuit of 
a narcissistic search for personal happiness (e.g. Turnbull & Dawson, 2006). I also felt 
there was a profound resonance between post-structural ideas of the divided subject 
(e.g. Barthes, 1985) and Buddhist constructs of emptiness and no-self (e.g. Rahula, 
1959), a resonance which contributed to the generation of my theoretical constructions. 
Grounded theory can be taken in a post-structural direction (e.g. Clarke, 2005), 
which emphasises the inescapable subjectivity of meaning, how identity is constructed 
through discourse, and how dominant discourses in society influence social behaviour 
and power dynamics (Foucault, 1977). Within this approach, grounded theory has been 
used with the intention to challenge and deconstruct discourses that maintain oppressive 
power dynamics, and to give a voice to non-dominant discourses. For example, 
Licqurish and Seibold (2011) undertook a post-structural grounded theory study in 
which they interviewed midwifery students about competency, finding that the 
dominant medical discourse is linked to disciplinary power which maintains the status 
quo. 
33 
 Auto-ethnographic research has also been taken in post-structural directions (e.g. 
Gannon, 2005; Spry, 2001). Gannon (2006) writes of a conflict between humanistic 
assumptions and post-structural deconstructions of self, suggesting that while 
“autoethnographic research seems to presume that the subjects can speak (for) 
themselves, poststructural theories disrupt this presumption and stress the 
(im)possibilities of writing the self from a fractured and fragmented subject position” 
(p.475). Post-structural research can be constructed to articulate this multiplicity of 
selfhood and challenge divisions between subject and object. Barthes (1985) asserts that 
“The subject that I am is not unified” (p.304), while Foucault (1997) describes writing 
in order to “shape the self” (p.211); what emerges is the image of a divided and 
conflicted experience of subjectivity that cannot be constructed through a coherent 
single narrative.  
In his teachings on topology, Lacan (1966/2006) used the Möbius strip as a 
representation of human subjectivity. A non-orientable topological surface possessing 
only one face and one edge, this form for Lacan expressed both the internal and the 
external, the conscious and the unconscious, simultaneously without positioning them 
as mutually exclusive. Following the strip’s edge always marks a coming back to a 
place that is the same but different, which Lacan argued expressed the “return of the 
repressed” (Freud, 1915/1957, p.148), pointing at how the unconscious is intertwined 
with the conscious rather than existing in some way below. This is particularly relevant 
in considering empathy, as it offers a new way of understanding the relationship 
between self and other, something that was also taken up through the notion of 
intersubjectivity by relational psychoanalysts (e.g. Ogden, 1994). Similarly, the feminist 
post-structuralist writer Elizabeth Grosz (1994) suggests that subjectivity takes the form 
of a Möbius strip, through the continual reconfigurations of dichotomous dimensions 
such as inside and outside, and body and mind. The advantage of this metaphor is that it 
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is able to suggest that rather than being two separate things, or two manifestations of the 
same thing, the intersubjective experience may be both and neither of these things at 
once. 
Lacan (1955-56/2006) suggested that lack and desire are intrinsically bound up 
with the process of language. This meant that for Lacan no mental objects, including his 
own theories, could escape decay, incompleteness and loss. As Bowie (1991, p.10) 
writes on his commentary on Lacan’s Family Complexes (1938), “All productions of the 
human mind are already marked with the death’s head: fading, failing, falling short, 
falling apart, lapsing and expiring are their native domain”. Impermanence and loss are 
inscribed into any mental object, which transforms psychoanalytic theory itself by 
suggesting that it can never fully come from a place of rationality or completeness, but 
is always in a state of flux, sliding towards death.  
Post-structuralist writer Hélène Cixous speaks to the divided experience of 
subjectivity with her assertion that “The origin of the material in writing can only be 
myself. I is not I, of course, because it is I with the others, coming from the others, 
putting me in the other’s place, giving me the other’s eyes” (Cixous & Calle-Gruber, 
1997, p.87). Post-structural approaches to research demand a “personal writing that is 
scandalous, excessive and leaky . . . based in lack and ruin rather than plenitude” 
(Lather, 2000, p.22). This approach may be extended to use in a grounded theory 
method in order to both critique oppressive discourses and force the researcher to face 
their own “lack and ruin” rather than situating it in the participant. These ideas seemed 
to add to Buddhist suggestions that, on close inspection, the self-construct is found to be 
illusory (e.g. S. Batchelor, 1997), challenging me to write my work from this position of 
the divided subject. 
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Rationale for grounded theory 
Various qualitative methods were considered for approaching this research project. 
Grounded theory was adopted because of its potential to go beyond description and 
towards theory generation (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). This study is based on social 
constructionist epistemological assumptions (Charmaz, 2006), with the intention to 
explore how participants create meaning in their experiences of empathy and how these 
meanings are embedded in a social context. Although empathy has been constructed in 
various theoretical traditions, very little of this has been based on qualitative research 
with a rigorous methodological framework, such as grounded theory. Most existing 
theories of empathy are not grounded in data gathered from therapy practitioners. 
 Charmaz (2006) describes the process of entering into her participants’ social 
settings, but also seems to suggest that this might involve an empathic endeavour: 
“Through our methods, we first aim to see this world as our research participants do: 
from the inside. Although we cannot claim to replicate their views, we can try to enter 
their settings and situations to the extent possible” (p.14). This description of the 
research process is almost identical in nature to Kohut’s (1984) definition of empathy as 
“The capacity to think and feel oneself into the inner life of another person” (p.78). The 
grounded theory methodology therefore appears to value the process of understanding 
the experience of another human, which is in accordance with my view of the important 
role the process of empathy has in the therapeutic relationship.  
A parallel may also perhaps be drawn between grounded theory and meditation 
practice. Glaser (1978) suggests that the first question to ask in a grounded theory 
approach is, “What’s happening here?”, in attempting to identify the social processes at 
work. In the Zen tradition, the koan “What is this?” is used to explore the nature of self, 
experience and reality (S. Batchelor, 1997). Although in their original contexts these 
questions have different purposes, I found it helpful to hold them both in mind, bringing 
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a meditative cultivation of doubt and enquiry to my attempts at coding. Thus, the object 
of study and the methodology adopted had at times a significant overlap. 
 The choice of using a grounded theory method in this study was also guided by a 
sense of my own values; I identify my therapeutic approach as relational, and am 
largely informed by the psychoanalytic tradition. In the research process I give thought 
to the unconscious dynamics evoked in the interpersonal relationship between 
researcher and participant. I am interested in Devereux’s suggestion (1967) that the 
research endeavour is inherently anxiety-provoking and must be approached like the 
psychoanalytic session, with a consideration of transference and countertransference. 
Kuehner (2016) suggests that research stirs up powerful feelings of fear and impotence 
in the researcher, but that these feelings are useful in encountering and reflecting upon 
the human condition. Working with grounded theory provided me with a containing 
framework, courtesy of the different steps of coding and memo-writing, allowing me 
space to explore my own response to the research process in the context of the 
responses of my participants.  
 
Participants 
10 psychotherapists, psychologists, and MBSR teachers who had a regular mindfulness 
meditation practice participated in the study (see Appendix one for participant 
demographics). No other inclusion or exclusion criteria were applied. This was because 
I would have had had no theoretical basis for setting any time frame on how often a 
person meditated, or how many years they had been a qualified therapist. I wanted to 
interview participants with different training backgrounds and levels of meditation 
experience. 
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 Additional data was used from a further four participants who were interviewed 
for a prior research study I conducted (Millon & Halewood, 2015). These participants 
were counsellors, psychotherapists, MBSR teachers and dramatherapists with a 
mindfulness meditation practice (see Appendix two for participant demographics). 
 
Ethical considerations 
Full ethical approval was granted by the University of the West of England ethics 
committee (See Appendix three for confirmation letter). I anticipated that discussion of 
empathy and therapeutic relationships more generally could cause psychological 
distress as participants reflected on, and perhaps questioned their own practice. It was 
also possible that participants could have disclosed information that might have caused 
me to suspect professional malpractice. I informed participants of these risks in taking 
part on an information sheet prior to them giving their consent. (See Appendices four 
and five for participant information sheet and consent form.) 
 Information on name and contact details of participants was stored separately to 
the interview transcripts. In all dissemination of the work, no identifying details of 
participants were given and some demographic data was altered in order to maintain 
participant anonymity. This included creating pseudo-initials when quoting participants. 
Audio recordings were collected on a portable digital recorder, and transferred to a 
secure password-protected computer within 24 hours of the interview taking place. 
Transcripts were made within three weeks of the interview and potentially identifying 
material was removed at this stage. Following transcription, the original audio 
recordings were destroyed. Only my supervisors and I had access to data collected from 
this study, and all analysis was conducted on my personal computer which is password 
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protected. Transcripts will be kept on a password protected computer on a secure system 
for seven years; after this point they will be destroyed. 
 
Procedure  
Sampling 
Snowball sampling was used to recruit participants through my existing professional 
contacts and those of my supervisors. The rationale for snowball sampling was that it 
was expected that therapists that practice mindfulness meditation may attend meditation 
groups or professional development events with other individuals who might be suitable 
participants. This proved to be true. An advertisement for recruiting participants was 
circulated by the BPS Division of Counselling Psychology mailing list, but this proved 
less fruitful.  
 Consent to use data from the four participants previously interviewed for a prior 
study (Millon & Halewood, 2015) was sought and granted to add additional data to the 
analysis. Although this prior study focused on countertransference, participants’ 
reflections on the therapeutic relationship and empathy made the data highly pertinent to 
the present study. 
 Midway into the project, theoretical sampling was used to recruit and interview 
three therapists who were also Dharma teachers: individuals with highly extensive and 
intensive meditation experience who had undergone training in Buddhist centres in 
order to learn how to pass on Buddhist teaching themselves. These individuals all 
frequently led meditation retreats at which they would offer teachings about Buddhist 
theory and practice to students. The reason for seeking this additional data was because 
previous participants had spoken of what they had learned about empathy from Dharma 
teachers, suggesting that with decades of meditating comes a particular depth of 
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awareness, kindness and humility. With the hope of generating new ideas and refining 
my tentative categories (Charmaz, 2012), I recruited three participants through the 
websites of Buddhist retreat centres, in a search for teachers who were also trained as 
psychotherapists or psychologists.  
By searching an online repository of Buddhist teachings, I found two talks on 
empathy given by Dharma teachers (Brach, 2012; Weber, 2015) which I transcribed and 
selectively coded. As these talks were part of the public domain, posted online for the 
benefit of others in developing an understanding of Buddhist teaching, I understood that 
it was not necessary to approach the teachers to ask for their informed consent in 
including their data in this study. This was in accordance with Eysenbach and Till 
(2001) who suggest that from an ethical perspective, it is important to determine 
whether postings on the internet are private or public communications, with the latter 
not usually requiring consent. This theoretical sampling, in accordance with the 
grounded theory method (Charmaz, 2006), helped me particularly to develop the 
category of Trembling with the other.  
Dey (1999) suggests that theoretical sufficiency, the point at which data 
collection stops, is achieved when no further ideas are generated. I was critical of this as 
my experience was that ideas continued to arise throughout the research process, and 
that the rationale for stopping sampling and data collection was based on time 
constraints. I do not believe it would ever have been possible for ideas to cease 
generating in the face of new data, due to the “unstoppable signifying process” (Bowie, 
1991, p.185) through which meaning is endlessly constructed in our lives, never 
reaching a fixed endpoint.  
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The research setting 
Interviews were conducted in participants’ workplaces. I felt that participants might be 
more comfortable speaking openly about their empathic experiences in their own 
environments. I wondered whether this helped establish a more mutual power dynamic 
than if I had invited participants into my own office for the interview. 
 
The research interview 
Individual hour-long unstructured interviews were conducted. These “allow the 
interviewer to delve deeply into social and personal matters” (DiCicco-Bloom & 
Crabtree, 2006, p.315). Highly structured interviews were not used, as I wanted to offer 
enough space to “encourage unanticipated statements and stories to emerge” (Charmaz, 
2006, p.26) which are vital to grounded theory. As I was asking participants about their 
experiences of empathy, a rather intangible subject, I felt it was important not to shut 
down seemingly tangential avenues of discourse by framing the interview with too 
many of my own preconceptions in the form of questions. This was anxiety-provoking 
for me at times (I also wondered whether it was anxiety-provoking for my participants) 
as there was so much scope for exploration. When this anxiety came out in the data, I 
tried to code it and make sense of it. It was necessary to provide a degree of structure 
(an agreed time and place), and I chose to set an intention for the focus of the interview 
by asking one initial question: “How do you experience empathy?” Participants were 
encouraged to explore their associations, reflections and any specific examples from 
their practice. The reason for only asking the one question was to encourage an open 
and non-directive relationship with the participant and their discourse in order to 
support the emergence of their own meanings.  
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I aimed to create a safe enough relationship with my participants so that they 
could feel as comfortable as possible exploring ambiguities and vulnerabilities when 
they came up in the interview. This meant attempting to be sensitive to the power 
dynamics in the interview, offering participants sufficient space to explore without 
intrusively interjecting with my own perspective, and asking follow-up questions that 
gave participants the opportunity to elaborate on their responses or to explore the 
assumptions that seemed to underlie their experiences. 
C. Watson (2009) is highly critical of the use of empathy in the research 
interview, suggesting it can be manipulative and that research should instead seek to 
acknowledge the differences between researcher and participant. This resonated with 
me, and produced an ambivalence or tension about empathy in the interview process 
that could not be resolved in any definitive fashion. In acknowledging my difference 
from my participants, I saw it as my role to pay close attention to how participants 
constructed empathy in their own unique ways, rather than forcing my own 
constructions upon them. In practice, this meant at times providing an alternative 
punctuation to the participant’s discourse, a punctuation that could produce new 
meanings (Fink, 2007) by virtue of the difference between our perspectives. This 
sometimes involved asking the participant to expand on a particular point, or gently 
bringing the participant’s awareness to instances where they contradicted themselves or 
trailed off mid-thought. For example, one participant spoke about her belief in empathy 
as purely good, and at another point in the interview suggested that empathy can be used 
abusively. Exploring the tension between these perspectives led to her constructing an 
idea of the shadow side of empathy. 
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Data analysis 
Interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed in full. The interview transcripts were 
then analysed following the steps of the grounded theory method which involved 
multiple stages of analysis, starting with line-by-line open coding. The gerund, a verb 
that functions as a noun, was used for all coding. This “builds action right into the 
codes” (Charmaz, 2012, p.5), offering a way of coding subtle actions and processes that 
could otherwise be easily missed. These open-coded transcripts were then imported into 
the nVivo computer software program which was used to manually input a further layer 
of coding. This second layer of coding was more interpretive (see Appendix six for 
example coded transcript). As advised by Suddaby (2006), I did not use the computer 
software to automatically code data but rather used it to aid my interpretive and creative 
process. Using the nVivo software package aided the constant comparison process, as 
all codes were instantly accessible and could be linked to memos. This encouraged me 
to reflect on codes that I might have ignored due to their not fitting neatly into existing 
categories, and helped ensure a consistent grounding in the data. Focused codes were 
manually organised into clusters based on similarity and difference. New codes were 
created to encapsulate others, gradually resulting in the construction of categories. The 
use of the constant comparison method (Charmaz, 2006) meant that throughout the 
research process, early interviews were used to develop tentative constructions, with 
subsequent interviews being coded with these constructions in mind, ensuring a close fit 
with the data and forcing an in-depth examination of how meanings might subtly differ 
and relate to one another. This meant comparing data with other data, data with codes, 
codes with other codes, codes with categories, categories with other categories, 
categories with data, and the analysis as a whole with existing theory and research 
(Charmaz, 2012). For example, a participant might construct empathy in a particular 
way at one moment in the interview, and in another way at a later moment. Comparing 
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the two was a way of generating new ideas, where each unit of comparison opens up 
new perspectives on the other. As suggested by Charmaz (2006), data analysis took 
place concurrently with interviewing, whereby each process informed the other. 
Throughout the analysis, I was aware of how my theoretical construction was just one 
of an infinite number of potential interpretations of the data. As Dey (2007) writes, “The 
voice of the author becomes one among many and its claims to authority become more 
modest, and paradoxically perhaps, more persuasive” (p.187). 
It was important to reflect on my insider status (e.g. Greene, 2014) throughout 
the research process, something that I attempted to monitor through dialogue with my 
supervisor and memo-writing. Participants sometimes asked me whether I practiced 
mindfulness myself. When they did, I disclosed my history of practice including where I 
had received teaching and thereby something of my identity as a therapist who practices 
mindfulness. I noticed that participants often seemed to feel comfortable in referring to 
Buddhist concepts in interviews, perhaps assuming we shared an understanding of their 
meaning. This shared identity enabled me to feel an affinity with my participants, but 
this also created the potential for over-identification. However, as argued by Hoffman 
(2009), the process of the researcher bringing their own framework to the research 
actually mirrors the therapeutic encounter in which therapist and client co-create 
meaning and identity, and that any attempt to eliminate the researcher is futile and 
counter-productive. Warren (2012) suggests that “Rather than viewing such influence as 
a contaminant of some purportedly pristine and unadulterated raw data, we take such 
acts of interpretation to be a precondition for knowing anything at all” (p.142). 
Throughout the research process, I kept memos as a record of my ideas and 
responses. Memos were recorded in nVivo, and were linked to particular data sources, 
codes and categories. Sometimes memos took the form of emotional responses to 
interviews with different participants, or intellectual responses to ideas expressed by 
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participants. Other memos expressed ideas or fantasies in response to a specific code or 
the state of the project in general. Memos were also written to explore the nature of the 
relationships between all my constructions. In addition to enhancing the depth of the 
research project (Etherington, 2004), it was important to reflect on empathy in the 
research process, and my own responses to participants and how I related to those 
responses. This reflection encouraged close interaction with the data and an increased 
awareness of my personal processing of empathic experiences. I wanted to bring 
elements of post-structuralism to my reflexivity; to me this meant refusing to define 
myself through my demographics in a stand-alone section of my work, but rather 
attempting to write my own “lack and ruin” (Lather, 2000, p.22) into the work as a 
whole. 
 Although diagramming is considered by some grounded theorists (e.g. Strauss, 
1987) to be an important way of representing the relationships between categories, I 
experienced a considerable degree of resistance to the process, which felt overly 
constricting at times. It took a long time to construct a visual representation that fitted 
my intuitive experience of the data. Part of my resistance was that diagramming often 
seemed to create linear processes where one stage led neatly to the next, when what I 
wanted to construct was a theory that acknowledged its own fragmentation and lack. I 
became interested in impossible objects such as the Möbius strip (e.g. Lacan, 
1966/2006), which offered new possibilities for representing relationships in a non-
linear way. It was this line of thinking that led me to a way of meaningfully representing 
my theoretical constructions. 
 As suggested by Charmaz (2006), I delayed a full literature review until my 
categories had begun to take shape. Although prior to data collection I broadly 
summarised some of the main therapeutic perspectives on empathy, it wasn’t until much 
later that I focussed in on the existing theory in any depth. I was, for example, led by the 
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data to devote significant attention to the writings of Lacan, a psychoanalyst I had never 
studied previously but whose theory of the imaginary order (Lacan, 1949/2006) helped 
me to make sense of one of my categories. This process of being guided by the data 
about which literature to sample led to my write-up coming together in fits and starts. 
For a long time the write-up consisted of disconnected sections with little to obviously 
connect them, but gradually I started to make links and the constant comparison method 
(Charmaz, 2006) encouraged me to think about how different ideas in the literature 
related with each other along with my own findings. The generation of new ideas never 
fully ceased, which made it difficult to end my work, and it was the severity of a firm 
deadline that provided the inevitable halt to my research activity. 
 
Reflections on the research process 
As suggested by Devereux (1967), “insight must begin at home” (p.14) when 
conducting research in the social sciences. He argued that the process of undertaking 
research stirs up the unconscious of the researcher, arousing great anxiety. This 
certainly resonated with my experiences, suggesting that both the area I was researching 
and the method I was using had deep personal meaning for me. At times I was more 
aware of this than at others, and I’m not sure I could truthfully say that my insights 
began at home, but perhaps rather that my home was burgled by insights. These insights 
were occasionally interesting, often opaque, and usually uncomfortable. If, as argued by 
Kuehner (2016), “research is a performative act” (p.727), I choose to keep a part of my 
relationship with this research process hidden from the reader. I describe some 
fragments below, but decline the opportunity to attempt a full disclosure here; although 
I have thought a lot about what my research means to me, perhaps some of what it stirs 
up remains a secret even from myself. 
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As the research process went on, I seemed to become increasingly identified 
with my research. At times it felt as though a seed had been planted in my belly that was 
growing into a plant that was devouring me from the inside-out. Clearly I had some 
rather ambivalent feelings about the pregnant possibilities of my research. The feeling 
of something inside of me was often unbearable, the excitement of having ideas and 
making connections made me want to run around the house or cough something up from 
my body. I gradually realised that it was my own aggressive urges for independence and 
separation that I was so struggling to sit with. I experienced an anxious tension between 
feeling drowned in the perspective of an other (whether my participants or other 
theorists), and guilt at having a different view. My writing could tend towards a fearful 
and brittle coldness.  
 To break free of this paralysing identification I felt I needed to tear strips out of 
my writing, as if it was an arm I was peeling long stretches of skin off to expose 
something raw. Sometimes I would repeatedly strike my fist on my desk in frustration. 
The merging and dividing up of codes and categories felt as though it was me that was 
being wrenched around, cut-up and amalgamated. Often it was so painful I thought I 
would have to give up; I would feel as though I had reached the limits of my 
understanding and was infuriatingly being confronted with my own smallness of mind. I 
felt some degree of fear as I constructed a tentative understanding of the data, seeing 
that what was emerging was something at odds with what both participants and I would 
perhaps be entirely comfortable with. My supervisor encouraged me to stay with the 
unconscious processing without trying to force it too quickly into anything overly 
constricted by pre-existing theory. I felt a sense of guilt at potentially exposing or 
tearing down what at times felt like a defence that we all collude in to some extent: 
locating lack in the client, to whom we as therapists dole out the nutritious empathy. 
What came to be most helpful in breaking through my symbiotic relationship with my 
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data were the moments of punctuation: meetings with my supervisor, deadlines, the 
simple rituals of university processes that symbolise the ending of one stage and the 
commencement of the next. 
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Analysis 
 
Two main categories were constructed from the data: Defending a fragile self and 
Trembling with the other. Defending a fragile self was comprised of two sub-categories: 
Identifying with an empathic ideal and Struggling to remain separate. Trembling with 
the other was comprised of three sub-categories: Acknowledging lack, Realising 
interconnectedness and Meeting the unknown. There was a degree of overlap between 
subcategories, suggesting that there weren’t rigid boundaries separating them. 
The relationship between the two categories Defending a fragile self and 
Trembling with the other, was represented as a Möbius strip (see Figure 1). Although 
these categories could have been constructed as two distinct types of empathic 
experience, I felt it better represented the data to construct them without recourse to 
such a binary. Participants sometimes communicated both categories simultaneously 
even in one single phrase, suggesting that rather than oscillating from one to the other, a 
more experience-near way to understand the relationship would be to construct them as 
different manifestations of the same process. Empathy as a protection of a fragile self, 
and empathy as a trembling alongside the other may therefore be understood as 
occurring simultaneously. This is of course a paradox, as the categories seem to be 
diametrically opposed. Indeed, it may be nigh-on impossible to resolve this paradox 
intellectually. However, I believe that this paradox speaks to the heart of my 
participants’ experiences; it articulates the ambivalence of the heart that is both 
constricted and expansive, the heart that loves and hates. I believe that in representing 
the experience of empathy as a paradox, it evokes that same quality of intangibility and 
unintelligibility: a grandiose selflessness, a blind perspicacity, a foolish wisdom, a 
distant intimacy. As with all of these paradoxes, Defending a fragile self and Trembling 
with the other can be constructed as both separate and inseparable ways of empathising, 
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as one and as two. In order to represent this visually, I chose a Möbius strip as a symbol. 
This form can be created through putting a half twist in a strip of material, and then 
joining the two ends. The loop that is created appears to have two faces but on running a 
finger around one of the faces, it becomes apparent that there is only one; the finger 
always returns to a place that is the same but different. This to me communicated the 
relationship between the categories as being distinct and yet equivalent, a binary pair 
and a unified whole. One participant communicated this idea in her perception that 
human subjectivity manifests both freedom and imprisonment: 
 
“For me, they embody different aspects of the mind that is free; versus the mind 
that is cluttered, the mind that is in suffering; they carry and communicate with 
all the different unconscious layers of wounding and the existential places in 
their histories, and all the rest of it.” RE (a female core process psychotherapist, 
Dharma teacher and ex-nun – interview data) 
 
Similarly, in a Dharma talk, Tara Brach (2012) asserted that the individual self and the 
collective self exist in tandem: 
 
“We have this design to perceive separation and just consider a few people part 
of us, me. But we also have this capacity to recognise that and widen out. So it’s 
both that’s going on, the separate self and the more communal self.” 
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The Möbius strip produces a felt sense of mystery that defies intellectual resolution; this 
visceral sense of the unknown seemed integral to the process being explored and I 
wanted to ensure that this did not get repressed in my work.  
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Figure 1 – How empathy is constructed by therapists who practice mindfulness. 
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Defending a fragile self 
Two sub-categories: Identifying with an empathic ideal, Struggling to remain separate 
 
In talking about empathy, most participants at some point referred to a construction of 
an ideal; a paragon of empathy. This empathic ideal was initially located in another 
person, who seemed to become internalised into the self-construct. This meant that 
participants were Identifying with an empathic ideal, which seemed to bolster the sense 
of self as good, while disavowing less palatable aspects of self. Participants appeared to 
construct empathy itself as a symbiotic merging, in which there was no boundary or 
separation between self and other; this involved feeling emotions on behalf of the other 
and perfectly meeting their needs. The ideal self-construct seemed to go hand-in-hand 
with a construction of the other as enfeebled and needy. 
 However, participants also expressed fears of becoming overwhelmed or 
engulfed by the other. This was experienced as deeply disturbing; it was as if the sense 
of an individual self was threatened by empathising with the other. Experiencing 
empathy as a symbiotic union with the other therefore seemed to threaten participants’ 
need for autonomy. A degree of separation appeared to be necessary to manage this, a 
Struggling to remain separate. Therefore, in order to retain an individual identity, 
participants seemed to divide the experience of empathy into separate categories of self 
and other, with a firm boundary between them. Part of this construction of empathy 
involved taking a position of a detached reflecting observer which enabled the therapist 
to protect a separate sense of self. However, this construction of a separation was 
seemingly in opposition to their empathic ideal in which there was no gap between self 
and other. This led participants to construct separation as being in the interest of the 
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client, and in doing so it appeared to protect participants from any feelings of aggression 
they might have towards their clients that would challenge the ideal self-construct. 
 
Identifying with an empathic ideal 
It seemed important for participants to identify themselves as an ideal provider of 
empathy: a being of infinite and unconditional love and generosity. This identification 
seemed to initially proceed through a relationship with an idealised other who was 
endowed with authority and often held a social role such as a teacher, therapist or monk. 
Idealised others were not only experienced as powerful on the basis of their position in 
society, but were felt to possess particular qualities which many participants appeared to 
feel they themselves lacked:  
 
“I remember once ten years ago, being at a talk of a very senior Buddhist monk, 
and just being incredibly impressed at how when this person was talking about 
their emotional reality, they just knew it in such an embodied way. They knew 
their own internal tides, and how different emotions tasted and operated inside 
themselves, and how they would react and manifest in response and hand-in-
hand with what was going on with them emotionally and somatically. And yeah, 
I remember thinking, ‘this is where that process takes you’.” GB (a male core 
process psychotherapist – interview data) 
 
“I go to a—he’s the guy who’s a Tibetan Buddhist and, well he was a Jungian 
therapist but he doesn’t work as a therapist any more, and he’s been doing it for 
decades, much more than I ever have done, And I don’t imagine I’ll ever achieve 
what he—how he is, but there is a sort of feeling that that’s where I would want 
54 
to be.” SM (a female psychodynamic counsellor and MBSR teacher – interview 
data from Millon & Halewood, 2015) 
 
The figure of Buddha also provided a basis for idealisation. “(In) Buddha, one sees the 
awakened quality, the capacity of the human heart to embrace othering” (DM, a male 
core process psychotherapist, Dharma teacher and ex-monk – interview data). As well 
as locating the empathic ideal in another person, participants also idealised the quality 
of empathy and the practice of mindfulness as wholly good in and of themselves: 
 
“I see it (empathy) as, essentially, very healthy and positive. And so, therefore, I 
will celebrate, in some ways, that mindfulness is being used by army seals, even 
if it is to create healthier killing machines (laughs)!” LS (a female integrative 
psychotherapist – interview data) 
 
Empathy in such terms gets constructed as a magical food with the power to fill a 
profound lack: 
 
“Empathy is contagious, perhaps. That it’s seductive: if you’ve tasted, if you’ve 
sipped, from the cup of empathy, then you want more, because it’s good.” LS 
 
Accounts of the empathic ideal appeared to lack ambivalence; it was described as purely 
good and seemingly without complexity. Participants described a need to protect their 
ideal from corruption: 
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“I’d like to keep the territory of empathy as something wholly good, with wholly 
good intent… Again, I think we’re talking about forces that are bigger than what 
I would like to define as just empathy; I’d like to keep it in this little, kind of 
hallowed, sacred bubble, that’s not contaminated by these horrible realities, but 
clearly that’s a bit naive.” LS 
 
Through constructing a relationship with an empathic ideal, participants appeared to be 
able to internalise something of this ideal quality, offering them the opportunity to grow 
into a more empathic person.  
 
“Very beautiful thing to see and experience, you know, if you come across such 
people in your life. I’ve been very blessed with having some of my teachers, 
mentors and others I have met, where you can really see they are a living 
embodiment of that capacity. So you think ‘wow’, you know, we can have some 
healthy projections onto them, you see: ‘Wow! what could I not become, if I 
really develop my heart? I could—’ so we mirror ourselves, in that way, in 
others.” DM 
 
Various forms of practice were undertaken, seemingly with the intention of internalising 
an empathic ideal. For example, the intention might be to cultivate compassion, with a 
practice derived from the Buddha’s teaching on the Brahma-vihāras. Through this 
process, participants appeared to construct themselves as an ideal and thus shore up 
their sense of self as good: 
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“Anything you admire you begin to resemble… Admiration is something that 
allows me to recognise the goodness of a quality and because I recognise this 
goodness, some of that goodness already starts to take place in me.” Akincano 
Marc Weber (quoted from Dharma talk, 2015) 
 
Participants seemed to construct their own identities around this internalised empathic 
ideal. The capacity to meet the needs of the client was particularly significant in this 
self-construct and was often articulated in ways that appeared to reflect a construction 
of the therapist as parent, and the client as child. For example, one participant 
constructed empathy as “kind of mother and a child thing” (LS) in which a “rich, 
healthy, empathic attunement” (LS) was offered to the other. This suggested an 
empathic ideal of perfect symbiosis, in which there appeared to be no gap between 
therapist and client. In maintaining the ideal self-construct, participants seemed to 
construct their clients as wounded and lacking. It was as if the therapist was providing 
the client with an empathic understanding for the first time in the client’s life:  
 
“So often people come who haven’t been properly listened to; haven’t been 
properly attuned to; haven’t been ‘got’ on that sort of emotional level, and for 
somebody to know that somebody ‘gets it’, emotionally, is very powerful in 
itself.” AD (a female core process psychotherapist and focusing teacher – 
interview data) 
 
“Psychotherapy is sometimes compensatory attention for… you’re getting a 
little potentised version of someone being deeply in relationship with you to help 
heal any lack of that you might have had.” GB 
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“Well, it’s as if therapy is mostly about having a relationship, with lots of them 
it’s—in a way it’s the first relationship they’ve ever had; the first positive 
relationship.” SM 
 
One participant referred to “that sense of that you’re feeling it for them” (MN, a female 
core process and somatic experiencing psychotherapist – interview data), a powerful 
capacity to take on the other’s pain so that they did not have to face it. In this 
construction empathy required no words; as if there was no gap between self and other: 
 
“And so if just in the act of, in whatever way it happens, the client knowing that 
that’s going on. They’ll sometimes just see it, without it needing to be explained 
or theorised. On some kind of alchemical level, that maybe they’re getting that 
that’s their feeling, it’s their story, and it’s their tenderness that is being 
mirrored somehow in the face of the therapist.” GB 
 
Participants’ accounts appeared at times to indicate a narcissistic pride in their 
therapeutic abilities: 
 
“I think now, over the years, I realised that I’m actually more highly sensitised, 
physically, than most people, and there is a group that says there are ‘highly 
sensitive people’ (laughs), and that’s 20% of the population. And if those groups 
were correct, then I would certainly fall into that group.” AT 
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Another participant claimed that they were even able to empathise with other species: 
 
“Can I have empathy with non-human subjects? And yes, of course. Can I have 
empathy beyond non-mammals? Well, why not?” LS 
 
One participant encouraged their clients to idealise them, claiming that acknowledging 
their unknowing would not be desirable: 
 
“You want the therapist you also can project a little bit of ‘expert’ onto; you 
don’t want a therapist to say ‘I know nothing’.” PL (a female clinical 
psychologist and Dharma teacher – interview data) 
 
This statement appeared to deny any gratification that the therapist might incur through 
being constructed as an ideal. Another participant suggested how she avoided emotions 
that challenged her ideal self-construct: 
 
“I don’t want to be present with how I’m feeling about my client so I kind of 
withdraw and avoid the feeling of being in touch with my countertransference, ‘I 
can’t be this awful therapist that feels this way about my client’.” JG (a female 
person-centred counsellor and trainee counselling psychologist – interview data 
from Millon & Halewood, 2015) 
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AT reflected on how maintaining an idealised identity constructed around expertise 
required a lot of psychic energy, leaving her depleted: 
 
“I think it can be a very isolating place to be, if you put yourself in the position 
of being an expert, but it’s also a really straining place to be, because you’ve 
got to maintain that, and it takes a lot of energy to be there all the time, and 
doesn't allow for other aspects - the shades of grey - to come into your life, you 
just have to stand firm, and that's an exhausting position to be in.” AT  
 
It seemed that through identifying with an empathic ideal, painful aspects of the 
participant’s experience such as need and lack could be excluded from their self-
construct, perhaps resurfacing in their constructions of their clients as enfeebled and 
vulnerable. However, this way of relating to the other was considered very reductive, 
stripping away their complexity and life: 
 
“When you’re in reaction, whether it’s your partner, your child, a political 
candidate, or in some more subtle way somebody of a certain race or socio-
economical whatever, when you’re in reaction you’ve created an unreal other. 
And by unreal other, rather than a living, subjectively feeling, changing, being 
with longings, fears and so on that is dimensional, the person has become an 
idea in your mind that’s two-dimensional and flat and just represents something 
really thin, they’re just not subjectively alive or real to us.” Tara Brach (2012) 
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Struggling to remain separate 
Constructing empathy as a perfect understanding as though there was no gap between 
self and other seemed to lead some participants to experience their clients as suffocating 
and intrusive, with the potential to annihilate their own sense of individuality and 
autonomy: 
 
“I’m actually seeing you from what is essentially me. So it means being really 
open, but, you know, the danger of that is that it can be quite overwhelming.” 
SM 
 
This fear of empathy as symbiosis was reflected in AT’s anxiety over “losing (her)self 
to the other person” in “getting drawn into their vortex”, and was echoed by DM’s 
reflection on the overwhelming effect of the mother’s experience on the unborn child, 
who has no capacity to protest or put up a boundary: 
 
“If you experience, maybe, being shaped - the embryological nervous system - 
being shaped in a womb space ...where you have to imagine all the emotions of 
the mother are filtered, constantly, through the prenate, who can’t—who doesn’t 
have the capacity yet, the cognitive capacity to say, ‘hang on, this is just mum’, 
you know. The self-other system is a much more fluid system then.” DM 
 
A fragile and vulnerable sense of self was believed by some participants to be 
fundamental to the experience of being human. This vulnerability spawned various 
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fantasies, of all which were relational in nature, in which the other was constructed as 
threatening in some way: 
 
“We are not so original in our horrors. The list of what you particularly fear is 
very limited. Is it going to eat me? Overwhelm me? Is it going to reject me? Is it 
going to abandon me? Does it make me sick? That’s about it. Those are our pet 
horrors. They go back to very simple structures, contact behaviour… Your 
whole self construct is nothing but a defence reaction against presumed pain 
that’s lurking out there for you.” Akincano Marc Weber (2015)  
 
As close contact with the other was feared to be potentially catastrophic, participants 
seemed to experience a need to maintain a degree of separation. Some participants 
appeared to focus on the construction of boundaries between self and other, and 
continually questioned whether an experience originated from, or belonged to, 
themselves or the client: 
 
 “So I think the more the psychotherapists are engaged in their own mindfulness 
practice, the more they will be able to watch their own process come and go, 
and be with the client’s process as it comes and goes and perhaps most 
crucially, know the difference (laughs softly), know which is theirs and which 
isn’t.” GB 
 
“And I have an awareness of that question – being with that question – of ‘is 
this me or is this the client?’” MN 
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This question of whether something belonged to therapist or client came up again and 
again, suggesting that it may have been the source of no small degree of anxiety. MN 
spoke of her need to “maintain an appropriate space between the two of us”.  
The boundary’s function for the participant seemed to be in allowing them to 
retain a separate sense of identity and preventing them from becoming overwhelmed by 
the other. However, this need for separation and autonomy was in contrast to the 
idealised self, constructed as perfectly able to understand the other. Perhaps because of 
this apparent tension, many participants were noticeably eager to rationalise the 
separation as being in the client’s best interests. PL explained how feeling the emotions 
of her client would reduce her therapeutic potency: “If I was feeling it myself I’d be 
probably not able to help”. The division of experience into self and other was justified, 
“to keep the experience safe for the client” (HO, a female core process psychotherapist 
– interview data), while another participant spoke of eliminating their own subjectivity 
from the therapeutic relationship: 
 
“It’s really important to notice the part of me that is mine, and kind of gently 
move it sideways, because that’s not helpful.” SM 
 
One participant described maintaining boundaries as a way of placing a limit on the 
invasive quality of the therapist’s “life”, which was perhaps a projection of the 
therapist’s fear of being invaded themselves: 
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“I think the boundary is important, and part of that boundary as we know is the 
containment of the therapist’s life not coming into the space. The therapist is 
there with their heart open and their presence, but to work on the client’s 
process, rather than to work on their own.” GB 
 
Another way of maintaining a separate sense of self was to withdraw attention from the 
other to focus on the self using mindfulness meditation. Participants described using 
meditative awareness of their own experience of their breath or body; this seemed to 
facilitate separation from the other. In this practice the focusing of attention on an 
“anchor” maintained the participant’s sense of centredness:  
 
“I’m really aware of how important it is to maintain quite a significant amount 
of attention on myself, when I’m sitting one-to-one with people, or when I’m in a 
group, so I don’t lose myself to the other person. I’m really aware of my posture, 
my breathing, the way I always gesticulate with my hands when I’m talking. I 
have an awareness of what I’m probably going to be saying, but I don’t pre-
empt what they’re going to say back to me, but that awareness stays quite 
significantly with myself at any given time, and I think that’s what provides me 
with the anchor, and that has come out of my practice, without question, and 
gives me that sense of being centred, whatever it is that my patient is talking to 
me about, or whatever.” AT 
 
This focus of awareness on the body that most participants described may have been a 
way of holding onto bodily boundaries in an attempt to maintain a degree of separation. 
SQ expressed the belief that mindfulness practice does not necessarily lead to the 
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development of compassion and the capacity to feel deeply. Instead she suggested that it 
can cultivate a “witnessing” relationship to experience, which can bring emotional 
detachment: 
 
“I feel like meditation on its own, as I see it, seems to support people to be 
calmer, and, yeah, to have more witness. But they’re not always the people who 
really feel something in their heart.” SQ (a female integrative psychotherapist – 
interview data). 
 
This suggestion was reflected in PL’s acknowledgement of her inability to empathise 
with perceptions she deemed different from her own: 
 
“But if someone is—someone’s basic interpretation of what happens to them is 
that it proves that the world is a dangerous place, and that you shouldn’t go out, 
and you shouldn’t take risks, and you shouldn’t travel - whatever - I can see how 
restricting that is, and I can really feel for the distress that that is causing that 
person, but I don’t have that interpretation of the world, so I don’t - in that 
sense - resonate with it.” PL 
 
This detachment seemed to keep the self safe from an other who was constructed as 
invasive. However, the defensive nature of this process of detachment did not appear to 
be acknowledged. Some participants described detaching from particularly distressing 
emotional experiences such as aggressive impulses: 
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“I’m detecting this urge to say something harsher, and to hurt him. And then of 
course, I’m a trained therapist, so I don’t act on it, but it’s really interesting to 
watch that happening.” MN 
 
It seemed aggression and separation were linked, with participants struggling to manage 
these feelings in relation to their clients. Many indicated anxieties that aggression and 
individuation would be harmful and destructive of the other. A symbiosis therefore had 
to be maintained to keep the peace. The tendency to deny the “horrible realities” (LS) 
of empathy’s potential for abuse indicated something of participants’ anxieties about 
relinquishing the ideal. DM spoke of how difficult it can be to acknowledge difference 
and separateness in the therapeutic relationship, suggesting a temptation to collude with 
the client in a symbiotic fantasy: 
 
“That’s the problem, when we speak of empathy, usually in many—it can kind of 
be a wishy-washy sweet sugar on top of you, yeah? it would be much nicer if we 
sat here and drank tea and put sugar on top of each other.” DM 
 
Many participants expressed guilt or anxiety about the idea of separating from the 
client; it was as if any wish for individuation or expression of hostility was dangerous 
and had to be denied. Some participants reflected on how identifying with an empathic 
ideal left little room for any of the therapist’s hostility towards their client: 
 
“We’ve taught ourselves that, ‘oh, this is one place where this person won’t be 
met with harshness’. So, yeah, it’s a very tricky one.” MN 
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Perhaps this “harshness” came out in unexpected ways; one participant made what I 
interpreted as a Freudian slip, expressing a dominating aggression towards her 
colleagues: 
 
“I’m a Yoga teacher, I’m also a mindfulness teacher trainer, I also do this one-
to-one work, I also own and manage other people—I don’t own other people, I 
own the building and manage other people!” AT 
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Trembling with the other 
Three sub-categories: Acknowledging lack, Realising interconnectedness, Meeting the 
unknown 
 
In Acknowledging lack, participants admitted their own limits and let go of their 
identification with an empathic ideal, along with the belief that they were able to 
perfectly understand their clients’ experiences. Participants seemed to come more into 
relationship with previously disavowed aspects of themselves. They acknowledged that 
there were things they did not know, and things that they could not control, which 
appeared to introduce a dimension of loss and lack to the therapeutic relationship. 
Indeed, it seemed to be from this place of lack that participants found change occurred. 
 Participants came to construct empathy as Realising interconnectedness, a 
softening of the boundaries between self and other. Empathy was experienced as an 
embodied expression of human nature rather than an individual capacity. Participants 
shifted focus to the intersubjective, and they described more mutual power dynamics in 
their relationships with their clients. 
Empathy was constructed as a Meeting the unknown that was primarily 
unconscious, embodied and intuitive. This type of experience was in opposition to 
intellectual knowledge that could be captured and made concrete, and was instead much 
less ego-bound. The need for knowledge and certainty was abandoned in favour of an 
enquiry into the experience of the interconnectedness of life in all its mystery. The 
empathic understanding of the other became permeated with a sense of the mysterious 
unknown. Staying on the edge of what could be known allowed participants to meet the 
mystery of the other, and tremble in their presence. 
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Acknowledging lack 
Participants described letting go of the ideal self-construct, and acknowledging the 
limits to their own therapeutic potency. Doing this meant realising that their capacity to 
offer empathy was not unconditional and infinite but instead determined and governed 
by their own past experiences, the constraints of the context in which they worked and 
more generally their human imperfections. There appeared to be a letting go of the 
fantasy that the therapist could meet all the client’s needs, and a realisation of a 
fundamental gap that could not be filled. Participants spoke with humility about the 
limits of what they were able to understand at any given time: 
 
“That’s what keeps it alive, you know? We’re not going to get it; I don’t get it, 
you know? With these sort of conversations, it’s not me coming from a place of 
‘this is how it is’, it’s all enquiry. This is the limits of my understandings right 
now. And I like it, to think of it like that, because I think mindfulness practice is 
a very modest practice.” RE 
 
LS suggested that “none of us contains the whole” and that in terms of perspective or 
knowledge, “we will have our little bit, and that there’s no one over-arching 
experience”. This indicated a comfort with plurality, fragmentation and lack; 
participants recognised that they could not meet all their clients’ needs and 
acknowledged that their own capacity for healing the other was limited: 
 
“It’s around acknowledging what I can bring to the therapeutic relationship, but 
also what I can’t bring… I don’t have a sense of needing to hold on to people, or 
to try and sell them stuff, or ram things down their throat that they don’t 
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particularly want; it is just ‘okay, we’re here, we’re two human beings together, 
working together as best we possibly can. I’m going to offer you what I know, 
what I’ve experienced and what’s helped me in my life, and hopefully they’ll be 
helpful to you, and we’ll assess that together, and if it’s not then move on’.” AT 
 
Empathy itself was recognised to be an ideal fantasy; LS acknowledged that her 
capacity for identification was limited, as she could never wholly become the other: 
 
“I don’t think empathy really, fully does and can exist in the purest form, 
because that would for me to be not-me, and for me to be the other.” LS 
 
Part of letting go of the ideal self-construct meant relinquishing the omnipotent striving 
for control. One participant suggested that this actually facilitated a profound change in 
and of itself: 
 
“Because you’re not trying to change things, things change. I think I’ve changed 
hugely, absolutely hugely, with the meditation. But actually, one of the key 
things in the mindfulness, and in any meditation practice, is not striving; it’s not 
trying to change things.” SM 
 
Participants described letting go, at least temporarily, of the self constructed as perfectly 
good and limitless in its capacity for empathy: 
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“If we all knew everything, and were omnipotent, then we’d be Bodhisattvas, or 
whatever, which is not necessarily what I’m aiming to be.” AT 
 
“I have an influence on things here, but that influence is not omnipotence. I 
cannot fix everything, there are boundaries. There are things I can change and 
there are things I cannot change.” Akincano Marc Weber (2015) 
 
There was also a letting go of the idealised other, who came to be recognised as in some 
way lacking or limited. Even the Buddha was disinvested of any omnipotence, instead 
being described as another “psychologist (rather) than a founder of a religious 
movement” (PL), whose wisdom was based on empiricism rather than any kind of 
divine or ideal quality. This allowed participants to challenge potentially dogmatic 
authority figures: 
 
“But there’s no expectation, in that tradition, that people should take anything 
as read, as dogma, just because I say so / the teacher says so / the Buddha says 
so, and I think that is very much how I would approach mindfulness-based 
therapy and other therapeutic work.” PL 
 
Participants acknowledged how much there was that they did not know, an unknowing 
that encompassed all notions of self, other and universe. This meant that an important 
part of the process of empathy was realising how much cannot be known of the other: 
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“It’s like the bit that you know is only a tiny grain, compared to all the bits one 
doesn’t know, about how that person’s universe is, at any point in time.” RE 
 
“It feels like we’re kind of there doing that together as well. Or I’m doing that, I 
have no idea what he’s doing.” JG 
 
In acknowledging the mystery of the other, participants described rejecting a position of 
authority; there appeared to be a comfort with taking a non-expert stance: 
 
“We’re all just moving through life together; that’s what it's about. It’s not 
about me knowing the answers or taking the high ground, or anything like that.” 
AT 
 
“It’s very much about being on equal footing, I always start the sessions with 
talking about being a mountain climber, I can tell you where the footholds are 
from where I can see them, but I don’t really know what it’s like to be you, and I 
don’t know and I can’t tell you any more than what I can see and what you 
share with me. I’m not an expert, there is no magic wand, I can just do what I 
do.” BD (a female acceptance and commitment psychotherapist – interview data 
from Millon & Halewood, 2015) 
 
Equally, trying to gain knowledge in a more fixed or intellectual fashion was 
experienced as something that shut down enquiry: 
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“Because when you stop trying to work out the answers—if I’m busy wondering, 
if a cloud’s coming over, ‘is it going to rain in the next few minutes?’ then 
there’s a part of my attention that’s distracted from being in this very moment, 
with the sun shaded by the thing, and having the peripheral vision of the blue 
sky, and being here with this little exploration.” HO 
 
Participants tried not to make assumptions about the other, staying open to the 
unfamiliar: 
 
“I mean I will have less to draw on; I’ll have less in common; I’ll have less 
resource, perhaps, but that’s not always a bad thing. I think, sometimes, having 
too much similarity can actually be a block to empathy, because therefore 
there’s room for assumptions and imagination, or too much of my own 
imprinting will become part of what forms; keeps me open to relationships. So 
there’s something to be said, I think, for not knowing another.” LS 
 
In relinquishing the identification with an ideal, there seemed to be a concomitant 
increase in awareness of the feelings that had previously been disavowed. It exposed 
one participant to her own “shadow”: the aspects of her self-construct that were almost 
intolerable. The capacity to do this seemed to involve a building up of strength, an 
ability to resist collapsing into disintegration when faced with these disavowed aspects 
of the self: 
 
73 
“So, the work I do working with people who have been through sexual trauma, I 
absolutely have learned, and know to be utterly true, that the line between good 
and bad isn’t between people, it’s within a person. And I think I used that quote 
when we met on the training day, the Solzhenitsyn ‘the line between good and 
evil runs through every human heart’. And so, it takes a fair amount of courage 
to even think—to even begin to look at your own shadow, and your own dark 
side, and your own – whatever – racism, sexism – whatever; your own, kind of, 
less-evolved self.”  LS 
 
Another participant spoke about examining his own painful emotions and 
acknowledging his murderous and suicidal phantasies. This feeling of profound lack and 
pain challenged the idealised construction of the self as good and whole: 
 
“Well, if you—when you begin to really look, with radical honesty, into - or 
when I do it, into my own heart - I don’t think there has been the thought and 
feeling that hasn’t gone through me. I might not have acted upon it, but certainly 
felt murderous rage; suicidal despair; feelings that I will do anything to make 
them go away. So, it’s like: tendency to addictive patterns, or just wanting to do 
my own thing; wanting to just tell the whole world ‘I don’t care if you all die’; 
or ‘leave me alone’; feeling such a strength of hurt and loneliness and 
alienation. And, when I really highlight those qualities, it’s from there that I 
really notice that, yeah, my goodness, I am a scandal.” DM 
 
Along with the acknowledgement of lack, participants recognised that empathy had the 
potential for being used oppressively: 
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“And also: the shadow side. That’s quite sinister. I need to sit with that, 
because, yeah, of course, empathy isn’t this pure, wonderful, pale panacea that 
will—not at all, if anything it will have potential for dis-ease, or disuse, or 
misuse.” LS 
 
The process of coming into a relationship with disavowed aspects of the self was 
believed to be closely intertwined with an empathic opening towards others: 
 
“That we in our own practice may embrace the unseen unfelt parts of our own 
being; that we not push any part of our own selves out of our hearts. Just to 
sense that as an aspiration. To truly hold with tenderness every part of our own 
being, and that these open tender hearts include all living beings, all living 
beings.” Tara Brach (2012) 
 
In letting go of the defensive and fear-driven struggle to remain separate, participants 
seemed to allow a different kind of separation. This separation seemed to be 
characterised by loss, and appeared to facilitate an empathy that sprung from this place. 
Participants recognised that no matter how much power they assumed, they lacked the 
power to change the other’s life for them. As this construction of empathy 
acknowledged a gap which the participant could not fill, the responsibility for change 
was shared with the other, who was encouraged to find their own unique understanding 
of themselves rather than simply absorbing the therapist’s ideal empathy: 
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“That impulse in the therapist isn’t to sort out, isn’t to offer remedies, because 
the more that you’re with people, as a therapist, the more you find out that the 
route that you would take for that person - no matter how sound it may look - if 
that person doesn’t find their own route, it really doesn’t work, because there’s 
something about my knowing being better than the other’s knowing. And I know, 
for myself, it doesn’t work for me, even if the therapist is wise, and knows, and 
knows more than me, it’s up to the individual to find their knowing and to 
sometimes do it in quite a messy way, with the process.” RE 
 
It was only from this place of lack and vulnerability that change and healing could 
begin: 
 
“I know how vulnerable it can really make you feel, to be seeing things in 
reality. And it’s very raw, but it’s the only place to start, really: with rebuilding 
and changing, and finding a new direction, really.” AT 
 
This deconstructed the empathic ideal, as no longer was it suggested that therapist and 
client were merged in symbiotic union, with no gap that the therapist couldn’t fill. 
Rather than the therapist giving the client what they never had in their childhood, 
something much more humble, sad, painful and real seemed to take place: a leaving 
behind and a growing up. Several participants suggested that all that could be 
realistically hoped for was to meet the client’s needs to a limited extent, but more 
importantly to offer the opportunity to learn from the times when those needs can’t be 
met. DM suggests that it was his own imperfect humanity that was particularly helpful 
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to the client in teaching them about old wounds. It was therefore from the place of lack 
that true healing was felt to occur: 
 
“Of course we can’t ever offer enough, and it also, there is a level where it is 
not our job to offer enough, you know, like Winnicott put it: ‘we offer good 
enough’; just good enough. So, empathically attuned. And also, when it is not 
good enough, those challenges that come up when we miss our therapist, or 
when we also feel too overwhelmed, the nature of the wounding of our clients 
collude with our own wounding, and they become—those breakages of contact 
become profound moments of learning. So, our job is not to offer more, or 
unconditionally; our job is to offer to be there and meeting the other. So, that’s 
the level where the answer is ‘no, sorry’.” DM 
 
This suggested that participants felt that it was only through accepting their own lack 
and vulnerability that they were able to offer something of real value to the client. RE 
emphasised the importance of this gap between the depth of the need and what could be 
offered. A different stance here was constructed as something to be prized, while a 
shared empathic understanding inhibited creativity or transformation: 
 
“And so, to settle for an empathetic relationship, for me, feels like a defeat 
rather than a success, in those terms. And it’s also got the danger of 
collusiveness, because if one feels as if we’ve got good empathy with another, it 
will be potentially empathising—an ongoing empathy ends up as agreement, at 
some certain level, and it—we fall asleep again, in that, when you really feel 
you’ve got a good empathetic relationship with another.” RE 
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Acknowledging lack allowed the therapist to take a different perspective to their client, 
and this difference, although painful and aggressive, felt necessary in cutting through 
any delusion or defence in the therapeutic relationship: 
 
“Sometimes the sword of truth - so to speak - that is not pleasant, that has to 
take charge the emotions, also to be able to cut through sometimes sitting with 
clients and noticing there is something that, out of love, that will cut through 
bullshit, and attack. Let’s go for the jugular, which I know is unpleasant, and 
charged.” DM 
 
A different perspective was experienced as deeply painful as it challenged the symbiotic 
fantasy of a perfect understanding. DM also described his “job as a therapist is to often 
hold the client to the fire, that is very uncomfortable for me, as well.” This form of 
empathy is characterised by the strength and courage required to withstand and turn 
towards pain and lack. Part of allowing the other to separate meant accepting their need 
to ultimately leave the relationship with the therapist. What appeared to be important 
was the therapist feeling able to tolerate this separation and not experience it as a 
catastrophic threat to their self-construct: 
 
“And that’s a very beautiful moment in therapy, where a client has come in a 
place of suffering and they’ve developed a sense of self-understanding, they’ve… 
their lostness in their suffering decreases, their sense of confidence and 
empowerment in who they are grows, and they kind of look you in the eye one 
day and say I don’t need to be coming and being with you anymore, and that can 
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be lovingly and respectfully negotiated and gone through and ended. It’s kind of 
like a life cycle, within… you know whether it’s three months or three years.” 
GB 
 
Realising interconnectedness 
As participants acknowledged their own lack and relinquished the ideal self-construct, 
they became more attentive to relationality; boundaries that maintained the sense of a 
separate individual were softened enabling a sense of interconnectedness. This was not 
the perception that everybody is the same, but rather an acknowledgement that the 
other’s subjectivity is as real as one’s own: 
 
“Can you sense a softening of the boundaries, can you sense the realness, the 
subjectivity of another person, their consciousness, their sentience? Can you 
sense that the deepest truth is ‘we’, this awareness that we share? … It turns the 
‘I’, the separateness, into a collectivity, a shared consciousness.” Tara Brach 
(2012) 
 
This seemed to mean a letting go of the fear of being overwhelmed by the other, and the 
concomitant defensive need to remain separate. DM reflected on his personal 
experience of softening the boundaries between the construction of self as healthy and 
other as dysfunctional: 
 
“Of course, it doesn’t stand up when you really go and listen and interview the 
other. In my case I worked seven years with homeless people; I ran a shelter for 
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homeless people, so god knows how many I have interviewed and listened to; I 
have listened to people’s stories. And, again, I was struck really by, literally, 
how many of those stories I could say: You know, you and I are not so different. 
The line, I would—between what we would consider a person in great difficulty, 
who can’t take care of themself, or who creates a lot of disruption in their own 
and other people’s life, and what we would call often a more functional human 
being. It’s a very, very thin line; almost non-existent.” DM 
 
Through softening the boundary between therapist and client, participants constructed 
their clients as less needy and lacking. There was less of a split between the idealised 
therapist and the enfeebled client, and both self and other could remain intact without 
facing catastrophic abandonment or retaliation.  
Realising interconnectedness allowed participants to acknowledge that they 
could be with and learn from their clients as fellow human beings. Participants 
described forming therapeutic relationships with a more even power balance: 
 
“And so there’s a kind of mutuality in that, which on that level is not about 
therapist and client, it’s just about two people meeting.” GB 
 
“We’re willing to be there in the meeting; our clients become our teachers; they 
learn; It certainly, in my experience over the years, has been like a profound 
humbling journey.” DM 
 
80 
There was something humbling about deconstructing the separation between self and 
other, which opened up a shared sense of humanity: 
 
“This is a movement that in a profound way connects us and takes us out of 
isolation: Me being such a glorious, independent, scintillating unit somewhere, 
somehow goes away when I know you have toothache and I have toothache. We 
resemble each other quite a bit when we have toothache.” Akincano Marc 
Weber (2015) 
 
The capacity for being in relationship was perceived as fundamental to human nature. 
This was a move towards interconnectedness and social process: 
 
“I will say that the nature of awareness, or the nature of the human mind-heart; 
the nature of our being; is relational. So, mark my words, it is relational.” DM  
 
This necessitated an opening to the chaotic fluctuation of a relational process. 
Tolerating the messiness of intersubjectivity was understood to be a crucial part of 
empathy: 
 
“And some of what the mind throws up will be to do with my own history and 
past, and some of it will be something a mixture of you and me, yes? A kind of a 
muddle. And I like—I think it’s important that there’s a muddle.” RE 
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The “field” was used by many participants as a term to represent a sense of 
interconnectedness at a level beyond that of the individual. DM suggests that the field is 
more than just the meeting of two people, but an encounter with something more 
infinite or unknowable: 
 
“But again, we are co-creating, uniquely, in this present moment. There is 
something—this relationship, you know, is really, you know, like Martin Buber, I 
could speak of: remember that from your studies; ‘I and Thou’. In the meeting of 
‘me and you’, something larger comes in. So, it’s like, in our meeting, we are 
co-creating a relational field, in which we allow more than just me and you to 
come into the room.” DM 
 
The experience of interconnectedness was constructed by LS as an intersubjective 
relationship that is unique to the time and place in which it takes place. There was an 
appreciation of impermanence: 
 
“The whole notion of intersubjectivity: there’s me, there’s you, and then there’s 
a unique ‘us’ that forms; a unique relationship that will happen, that will be 
happening here, right now, because we’ve never sat together like this. That will 
be more than the sum of the parts; it will be more than just you and me; it will 
be something that we co-create, and that is information to watching the dance 
that we will take.” LS 
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SQ described a softening of the ego boundaries, allowing her to be empathically 
“available” to the client in working with profound spiritual mystery: 
 
“It’s a kind of relating which is not from ego structure, and not from personality 
structure at all… But I suppose there are moments - because I’m available, 
because I’ve been there a little bit – there is a sense of something mysterious.” 
SQ 
 
Relationships with the wider environment were also brought into awareness as the 
boundaries between individual and environment were softened. This broadened the 
extent to which participants were able to experience interconnectedness: 
 
“It’s not enough for me to consider the other as individual and separate. 
Separate from me, be it separate from the world around that person, be that 
their family, their work situation or the state of the world and how it affects them 
at that point in time, their political - the particular conditioning aspects of that 
person’s culture, mind, gender, sexuality - whatever - you know. I’ll never know 
all of that, but we are not units, separate from all of that conditioning. So there’s 
a sense of an empathy towards the individual, but at some point you have to both 
deepen that - into oneself, and all of its affects - and also broaden our mind; 
field; our awareness, into the wider holding field, that’s not just about me and 
you, it’s about what we sit, yes, that’s conditioning us in the moment, as well as 
all the history, as well. And unless there’s a kind of a pausing in that, the 
empathy - again - is going to be quite constricting, and quite personal, and quite 
limited.” RE  
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“Similarly there is, for example, a relationship – when we widen our attention – 
that is happening with the wider field of, for example, the wider field of nature 
that goes on… My experience is: no, we are absolutely always connected up; 
literally on that level of being in relationship with planet earth herself, if you 
want to put it as another field, or relationship, or living being; another 
ecosystem.” DM 
 
AD referred to the Brahma-vihāras, usually translated as loving-kindness, sympathetic 
joy, compassion and equanimity, as being a part of the field of nature, rather than 
existing as personal qualities of the individual person. Because the boundary between 
self and environment was softened, the environment was available as a source of 
support: 
 
“Those aren’t just parts of oneself, they’re the fundamental qualities of our 
nature, and that they’re not simply personal. And so it’s that sense of drawing 
on that wider field, which is more than just the small ‘I’, if you like.” AD 
 
Empathy was constructed within a relational context rather than as a quality that 
belongs to an individual. RE articulated her experience that empathy depends less on the 
individual therapist than on their embodiment of interconnectedness:  
 
(Empathy is an) “aspect of our human nature that is obviously not owned by us, 
but expressed through us in relationship… it’s based on - in my opinion - the 
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practitioner’s embodied experience of interconnection… there’s another bigger 
matrix of intelligent awareness, that I trust in that is supporting the two of us if 
I'm open to it, in this moment, that will be - is part of this empathy.” RE 
 
This suggests participants felt that softening the boundaries was crucial in opening up to 
embodying an empathy that is not personal, but universal. Similarly, Akincano Marc 
Weber (2015) suggested that the Brahma-vihāras were equivalent to “universal 
empathy”. There was a sense of never being fully able to possess empathy, as it could 
not be constrained to the individual; nor could empathy ever be fully lost, as it was a 
fundamental part of the world: 
 
“The bottom line of the Brahma-vihāras is if developed they’re boundless, we 
can’t lose them even though we may forget them, so they are inherent, and 
they’re basically an expression of our interconnectedness. Ultimately I can’t be 
really happy unless you are happy because I am connected with you.” Akincano 
Marc Weber (2015) 
 
 
Meeting the unknown 
In discussing their experiences of empathy, several participants quoted a translation 
from the Pali word anukampa, along the lines of “To tremble along with the tremble of 
another” (RE). This empathic trembling was framed as an enquiry into the unknown, a 
question that has no attachment to finding an answer. This type of questioning was 
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intended to penetrate or open up the mystery without needing to close it down by fixing 
on any one particular resolution: 
 
“So, like in the moment - I really feel you can find this in your presence - but in 
the moment it would be kind of like pondering ‘who is this I am with?’ without a 
kind of need to get that—there’s no sort of agenda attached to that; just the sorts 
of questions that take us into that—it’s like we could be all sorts of places, yes?” 
RE 
 
“And in meditation, it’s very open, there is no answer to the question, it’s just a 
very open question and maybe that would be useful - yeah that’s an interesting 
thought - in one’s attitude towards a session afterwards. Did I do good there? I 
don’t know. There’s a lot of not knowing and sometimes the client will let me 
know when they come back the next time, that they got a lot out of it and 
sometimes they let me know before they leave even, but there is a lot of not 
knowing about whether what you’ve done is... What has evolved in the session, 
what the client’s been able to do that has been helpful.” HE (a female 
dramatherapist – interview data from Millon & Halewood, 2015) 
 
Participants cultivated an attitude of doubt, which although difficult to tolerate, was 
experienced as important in and of itself. Empathically, this meant not assuming that the 
experience of the other was being fully understood: 
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“In a session I’m continually going into the unknown, so I have to be continually 
checking out. But that’s what I really love about the work, that it is an 
exploration of the unknown. And the number of times I’ve sat with the person 
and thought ‘I don’t know what’s happening here, I don’t know where I’m 
going, I don’t know what to say, I don’t know how to take this forward’ and then 
if I can just accept that – ‘okay’ – and I can just sit with what’s in the room, if 
it’s hopelessness and confusion and not knowing – ‘okay, this is how it is’.” HO 
 
Empathy was constructed as powerful, creative and magical; it was a mystery that 
pervaded all the other levels of socially constructed reality: 
 
“But there is something about – well the best word that I can think for it is 
‘magic’ – the magic that arises out of that place. And now when I’m thinking 
about empathy, and how I said it was one of the holding blocks, as it were, and 
then I’m thinking that—or I’m feeling like, actually, that’s—it’s like continually 
getting below, and below and below; oh but the empathy is held by the magic; 
the unknown; the mystery. The mystery, is that what holds everything? The 
mystery?” HO 
 
One participant described empathy as a “threshold of awareness”, “that edge of 
knowing” (RE) which for her was the place at which she intended to be in both therapy 
and meditation practice. The willingness to stay on this threshold was “the awakening 
quality within the therapy encounter” (RE).  
 
87 
“The intention is just to be there, you know, just to be there. And that’s the 
threshold: the ‘just to be there’ threshold. And that ‘just to be there’ threshold, I 
feel, is an ongoing—is a continuum, you know: ‘just to be here, just to be here, 
just to be here, just to be here, just to be here’ until the other complexities of the 
human being start to make something of that.” RE 
 
This practice of being with the unknown ultimately required a leap of faith, as by its 
very nature its potential consequences couldn’t be pre-judged: 
 
“But I do trust that sometimes it helps the other. I do trust that. And, sometimes, 
maybe it doesn’t, but I do trust that at the end of the day, all I can do is that. 
It’s—that’s my practice. That’s my practice. At the end of the day, all I’ve got is 
my practice.” RE  
 
Participants were willing to share their unknowing with the client with the trust that in 
doing so change may occur: HO described the shared sense of surprise at what 
understanding or change could occur through her acceptance of the unknown: 
 
“And then, by the end of the session I’m—maybe the client, because I might have 
shared with them ‘I get the feeling I don’t know where we’re going with this’, 
and then by the end of the session, so often, the client and I have the ‘well where 
did all that come from?’. So that dropping into the unknown, and not having an 
agenda.” HO 
 
88 
This attitude of not assuming knowledge allowed participants to make use of explicit 
feedback from their clients rather than assuming the accuracy of their reflections or 
interpretations. This process allowed participants to feel they could learn from their 
mistakes, and subsequently change themselves as a result: 
 
“If the person says ‘no, that’s not quite what I meant’, that’s also fine, because 
then I’m guided by that.” PL 
 
“Humbling understood as like a learning I go through, thanks to my clients: 
they teach me a lot about my shortcomings, and where I am, then grow in the 
craft, grow in the skills, so hopefully I can offer a better quality presence.” DM 
 
Participants constructed the body as a recipient of intuitive, non-intellectual empathic 
understanding of the other. A trust was developed in this pre-verbal empathy. One client 
offered a particularly vivid memory of such an embodied experience of empathy: 
 
“I remember once sitting with a client and having this pain in my coccyx, 
thinking ‘what?!’ And she told me she’d fallen downstairs and landed on her 
bum. I mean, that’s so weird. That is really weird.” SM 
 
Participants seemed to create the body as a symbol for the unconscious, and it was as if 
this symbol mediated between the unknown and what could be put in to words. This 
construction of empathy went beyond what made rational sense and generated 
spontaneous insights: 
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“Sometimes it’s coming through the eyes, like I think, ‘oh, the way that person’s 
holding their shoulders – I want them to notice their shoulders, pay attention to 
what’s going on there’. But sometimes it doesn’t so much feel like it’s just the 
eyes, because if I was to look only with my eyes, I might think, ‘why am I asking 
them to sense into their knees? There’s nothing wrong with their knees, nothing 
strange at all, nothing’, but that’s where I’m drawn.” MN 
 
One participant said that they lacked the capacity to use their body as a whole in the 
way described above. Instead they discussed how what seemed important was that their 
heart served a similar function: as a receptive organ to non-intellectual knowing. In 
either case, a symbol is constructed to stand for intuitive knowing. 
 
“There’s a lot these days, isn’t there, about therapists’ use of their body, and 
what they sense in their body, and all that jazz. And a bit of me thinks 
‘urrrhmmrrrr can’t do that’, because I’ve got quite a lot of physical damage, 
myself, these days… What I certainly use and trust is: I get a response here 
(gestures to heart) and I’ll say it: ‘oh I really felt that there’. For the client 
yesterday, I had a kind of bomp here, and I: ‘so, how’s your heart doing?’ and 
all this!” SQ 
 
Another participant expressed her experience that relating to others from this place of 
intuition was “deeper – it probably sounds awfully pretentious – but, kind of, wiser” 
(SM). She went on to suggest that this was not personal to her, but an inherent part of 
human nature. The sense of an empathy which can’t be expressed through words came 
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up repeatedly in participants’ accounts of their client work. Empathy was experienced 
as primal and bodily, and apart from the realm of thinking or language: 
 
“So there’s such a connectedness through our physicality, that is nothing to do 
with the thinking processes; that is much more base and animalistic.” AT  
 
Another participant emphasised that this intuition cannot be forced; all that can be done 
is to wait for it to make itself known: 
 
“You can develop an understanding of the theories, the teachings. But until you 
have an embodied experience of them, you haven’t really understood. That 
doesn’t mean that you don’t work with your cognitive understanding and your 
sense of an emotional understanding, but what you’re always waiting for 
(laughs) and it is kind of waiting, inviting in really, is an embodied experience of 
vulnerability and impermanence. The truth of non-self. You can’t... if someone 
says, ‘you need to let go’, it’s almost a waste of words, because a person can’t 
consciously let go. It isn’t something you can do, is it? It’s something that you 
can over time create the circumstances to allow it to happen.” HE 
 
In this construction of experience as impermanent, empathy was much more a process 
than a quality or state. It inherently resisted being pinned down, quantified or turned 
into a fixed characteristic: 
 
91 
“I don’t think that one can be empathetic all the time; I think that’s impossible, 
because it’s not a state. It’s not a something for—well, you know, nothing is a 
something forever. It’s the beginning of something.” RE 
 
RE continued to explore her experience of empathy as temporary and continually 
changing, suggesting that it depended on many factors outside of personal control. 
Empathy could arise in an instant and was not to be held onto: 
 
“So I think empathy is a hard-earned experience. I think it’s momentary, and 
then it dissolves, because all the factors that brought you there, change. And 
sometimes people experience it as a meeting; just a touching; at quite depth; 
and sometimes people don’t experience it—the other doesn’t experience it. I 
would describe empathy as the process of attunement; it’s not getting it. Once 
you’ve got it, it’s passed, anyway.” RE 
 
Participants realised that the nature of their experience was a process in constant 
fluctuation. In letting go of an identification with an empathic ideal, it became apparent 
that everything was changing in a way that was beyond any control. The quality of this 
relationship with change was described as a trust: a profound knowing of its truth.  
 
“So, yeah, that sense of impermanence, and the transient nature of the way that 
we all are and things can change in the next moment, and that’s fine; I 
completely trust that that’s the way that life is.” AT 
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HO described her perception that although everyday objects appeared to be fixed and 
unchanging, they were actually perpetually shifting through their relationship with their 
environment: 
 
“I don’t see how it can be anything other than different each time, because 
everything—nothing stays absolutely the same, does it? Your recorder may stay 
absolutely still, but the shadow of the sun on this thing is moving. There’s 
nothing that is—the biscuits are still in the tin, but the temperature will be 
warming the chocolate.” HO 
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Discussion 
 
The grounded theory presented above constructs the psychological and relational 
processes involved in how therapists who practice mindfulness experience and 
understand empathy. The theory was influenced by my social constructionist position, my 
psychoanalytic framework and by my insider position as a therapist with a meditation 
practice. This study aimed to address identified gaps in the research literature in this area. 
I chose not to include research findings from quantitative studies in my discussion, as 
these were in keeping with neither my own epistemological stance nor more broadly that 
of the profession of counselling psychology, which prioritises subjective experience, 
takes a non-expert stance, and understands the individual as relationally embedded 
(Cooper, 2009). Instead I link my findings to the psychoanalytic literature, which has 
developed primarily from clinical experience and case studies (e.g. Warren, 2012). I also 
contextualise my findings within the writings of several key Buddhist thinkers.  
To summarise, the grounded theory constructed is as follows: The first category, 
Defending a fragile self, describes the way in which participants appeared to construct 
their identities around an empathic ideal; there was an assumption that they were able to 
perfectly understand their clients, as if there was no gap between them. This seemed to 
shore up a sense of the self as inherently good, while more difficult experiences appeared, 
in the interview at least, to be disavowed while the client was constructed as needy and 
lacking. However, constructing empathy as an ideal and the self as offering perfect 
symbiotic understanding appeared to lead to fears of being overwhelmed by the other and 
losing a sense of self. This resulted in struggling to remain separate, and maintaining a 
firm boundary between self and other, a boundary which was justified as being in the 
interests of the client. 
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The second category, Trembling with the other, describes participants’ 
acknowledgement that they lacked the capacity to offer an ideal empathy, and that there 
were always limits to what they could know or control. Participants described a 
realisation that all is interconnected, which softened the boundaries between self and 
other. In doing so, participants constructed empathy as an intersubjective process 
between themselves and the other which appeared to cultivate more mutual power 
dynamics with clients. Participants appeared to develop an intuitive, embodied 
relationship with an empathy that could not be fixed down or made tangible; there was a 
meeting the unknown which entailed a trembling with the mystery of the other. 
 
Defending a fragile self 
Identifying with an empathic ideal appeared to be central to participants’ constructions 
of empathy. This involved an idealisation of the quality of empathy, and by extension 
participants themselves, as providers of empathy. Many participants constructed their 
therapeutic role as to provide an empathy that had not been offered earlier in the client’s 
life. This seemed to fit with Kohut’s (1984) observation that unmet childhood needs for 
empathy continue to surface throughout life, and that the client’s need for empathy 
would get activated in the transference. Participants seemed very comfortable inhabiting 
the role of the ideal caregiver who offered empathy as mirroring or merging; many 
appeared to identify with this role without reflecting on the inherent transference and 
countertransference dynamics. This was suggested by the way in which participants 
spoke of empathy as truly and perfectly understanding their clients as if there was no 
space between them. Participants’ apparent gratification from the role of the idealised 
provider of empathy seems to fit with Kernberg’s (1970/1986) observations around 
narcissism as the belief that “my ideal image… and my real self are one, and better than 
the ideal person whom I wanted to love me, so that I do not need anybody else 
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anymore” (p.217). However, this identification with an ideal appeared to involve the 
creation of a false self (Winnicott, 1960) based around a capacity for empathy, which 
appeared to induce feelings of being powerful, special and without limits. Some 
participants spoke of being able to empathise with non-human species, or being much 
more sensitive than the average person. In Lacanian terms, participants seemed to be 
engaging in an imaginary identification with their clients (Lacan 1949/2006); in 
maintaining the comforting illusion that self and other are the same (“that sense that 
you’re feeling it for them”, MN), the otherness of the client was denied. 
Through identifying with this empathic ideal, it seemed that participants were at 
times using their clients as self-objects to stabilise their own sense of identity. This 
suggested that participants’ own narcissistic needs may have been emerging in their 
therapeutic relationships, leading them to seek mirroring and idealisation from their 
clients. I wondered if participants had difficulty integrating their own grandiosity with 
their vulnerability (Kohut, 1984), and whether their sense of self may have been 
constructed around an ideal or abstraction rather than a fallible, embodied human being 
with needs that may be gratified or frustrated (Winnicott, 1960). This would fit with 
research that suggests therapists may exhibit a higher degree of narcissistic injury than 
non-therapists (Halewood & Tribe, 2003) and that taking on the role of a therapist can 
perhaps be an attempt to vicariously meet one’s own narcissistic needs (Menninger, 
1957).  
Perhaps unsurprisingly in the light of this suggestion, it was less common for 
participants to describe the times they failed to meet their clients’ empathic needs. 
Kohut (1971/2009) emphasises the importance of moments when the therapist is unable 
to empathise with their client, requiring the client to learn to provide for themselves the 
empathy they need in a “transmuting internalisation” (p.74). Here the client’s sense of 
self is effectively built up and stabilised through encountering a degree of 
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disappointment and frustration that can be tolerated. It seemed that for participants such 
a process of failing to meet the clients’ needs might have been quite threatening to their 
own self-constructs. For example, JG said “I can’t be this awful therapist that feels this 
way about my client”. 
Alongside idealising the self, it also seemed as though the disavowed aspects of 
the self were projected on to the client who at times was constructed as weak and 
lacking. These tendencies towards idealising the self and enfeebling the other implied a 
split in which the participants got rid of the “bad” aspects of themselves by attributing 
them to the client; a process akin to Klein’s (1952) mechanism of projective 
identification. This suggests that participants may have been struggling to integrate both 
good and bad aspects into their self-construct. Constructions of empathy in the category 
Defending a fragile self therefore seemed to involve the therapist’s disavowal of their 
own vulnerability and projection of this onto (and perhaps into) their clients. This would 
seem to support the suggestion that empathy is a form of projective identification 
(Klein, 1955/1997; Hinshelwood, 1989) in which the self is projected into the other in 
order to understand their experience as if from within.  
However, this idealised empathy seemed to bring up a fear of “losing (one)self 
to the other person” (AT), an annihilation of personal autonomy through merging with 
the other. In the face of this, participants indicated that they were Struggling to remain 
separate. This need to take a separate stance is perhaps important for the therapist in 
being able to offer the client a new perspective. The capacity for separation has been 
linked with aggression; as Winnicott (1971) writes, “If the child is to become an adult, 
then this move is achieved over the dead body of an adult” (p.145). Johnson (1994) 
suggests that a persistent pattern of taking responsibility for the emotions of the other 
can mean finding a false sense of self which disallows expressions of autonomy and 
aggression. Participants seemed to struggle with the acknowledgement of any 
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aggression in the clinical encounter, as “we’ve taught ourselves that, oh, this this is one 
place where this person won’t be met with harshness” (MN).  
This suggestion of disavowed aggression fits with Safouan’s (1980) argument 
that Kohut’s self psychology approach leads analysts to narcissistically create ideal 
images of themselves as devoted helpers, a construction which allows them to ignore 
their own sadism. Johnson (1994) argues that hostility accumulates when someone gets 
drawn into a symbiotic relationship with little space for their own autonomy, and as this 
hostility can’t be expressed outright it can build up or get expressed passively. Perhaps 
this disavowed aggression represents the “shadow side” of empathy (LS), the hostility 
that arises as a consequence of emotionally merging with the other in the process of 
empathy. This may partly explain why participants appeared to be very concerned with 
the construction of professional boundaries, the preoccupation with determining 
whether a particular emotional experience belonged to self or other, and moving into a 
detached, observing stance at times, through focusing on the breath and the experience 
of the body. These attempts to focus awareness on the boundaries of the self and away 
from the client suggest that the practice of meditation has the potential to be used as a 
defence against being overwhelmed by the other, a means of shoring up a fragile self.  
 
Trembling with the other 
In Acknowledging lack participants came to the humbling realisation that they were 
profoundly limited in their perception of the world, their understanding of others, and in 
their power to effect change. This challenged their ideal self-construct, man’s 
“fundamental illusion” (Lacan, 1946/2006, p.153), and meant being confronted with the 
divided and lacking nature of life. There appeared to be a relinquishing of the identity as 
the inherently good therapist who could perfectly meet the client’s perceived needs and 
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lack; this forced an acknowledgement that the desire of the other can never be 
completely fulfilled. Participants began to acknowledge the parts of themselves that 
were almost unbearably painful: the “scandal” (DM). This seemed to echo Klein’s 
(1952) depressive position, in which omnipotence, splitting and projective identification 
are relinquished in favour of integrating good and bad. 
Acknowledging lack entailed a relinquishing of the empathic ideal, a giving up 
of the false self (Winnicott, 1960) which found security in symbiosis (Johnson, 1994). 
Just as Suzuki (1970) suggests that “When you do something, you should burn yourself 
completely, like a good bonfire, leaving no trace of yourself” (p.62), so participants 
gave up their narcissistic investment in an identification with an empathic ideal. As 
Epstein (1995) asserts, “What the meditator must keep confronting is her own capacity 
for conceit or pride, her own instinctive thirst for certainty, her own ability to co-opt the 
meditative process for narcissistic ends” (p.134).  
It was at these moments of acknowledging lack that participants truly 
acknowledged a separation from their clients. Participants did not seem to experience 
this separation as catastrophic; there was a sense of acceptance of differing perspectives. 
Into this gap that formed came the opportunity to create a new understanding with the 
client, one rooted in humility and lack rather than narcissism. This seemed to fit AT’s 
experience: “I know how vulnerable it can really make you feel, to be seeing things in 
reality. And it’s very raw, but it’s the only place to start, really: with rebuilding and 
changing, and finding a new direction”. Kohut (1966) suggested that it is through the 
patient tolerating their therapist’s failures that “the transformation of narcissism” 
(p.257) can occur, forging qualities such as creativity, humour, wisdom and empathy. 
For many participants, this seemed to involve allowing their client “to find their 
knowing and to sometimes do it in quite a messy way” (RE). Analysts from the object-
relations tradition also wrote of the importance of a space between self and other. Segal 
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(1957) suggested that in symbiosis there is no space between self and other, so there is 
no need or lack and consequently no symbolisation or thought. The capacity for 
symbolisation and use of language depends on this acceptance of a gap. 
 The creation of something new from a place of lack has precedents in both 
psychoanalysis and Buddhism. Lacanian analyst Leader (2008) suggests that all 
creativity is an act of mourning, while Lacan (1954-1955/1991) himself argues that 
“Being comes into existence as an exact function of this lack” (p.223). This suggests 
that the loss of an empathic ideal can give rise to an unexpected understanding, a new 
perspective that may creatively transform the relationship - as in the Zen proverb, 
“When my house burned down I gained an unobstructed view of the moonlit sky” (as 
quoted in Feldman, 2001, p.20). This construction of lack is present in many Buddhist 
tales of awakening. For example, Dogen’s enlightenment came as a result of 
contemplating the “lonely evanescence of life” (Suzuki, 1970, p.107) he felt on 
watching the burning of an incense stick as part of his mother’s funeral rites. His 
subsequent life of awakening and teaching could be constructed as a creative 
engagement with loss: an act of mourning. It seems that participants constructed lack 
and separation to be inherent to the process of empathy. 
In Realising interconnectedness, Participants spoke about feeling profoundly 
connected and bound up with the universe, while there was a “softening of the 
boundaries” (Brach, 2012) demarcating self and other or internal and external. The 
experience of interconnectedness seemed to fit with constructions of intersubjectivity, 
“a mixture of you and me, yes? A kind of a muddle” (RE). This linked to Ogden’s 
concept of the “third” (1994); the space where all processing of the conscious and 
unconscious experiences of the therapeutic relationship occurs. Taking an 
intersubjective stance meant acknowledging what the therapist was bringing to the 
relationship, rather like Sullivan’s construction of the participant-observer (1953). This 
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seemed to enable participants to form therapeutic relationships based in “mutuality… 
which on that level is not about therapist and client” (GB). What made this construction 
a development onwards from a two-person psychology (e.g. Balint, 1950; Spezzano, 
1996), was that the therapeutic relationship was also a relationship with the wider 
environment – it was not just two people but rather a matrix of interdependent 
conditions, empty of any intrinsic meaning or self. As Buber (1958/2000) writes, “We 
live our lives inscrutably included within the streaming mutual life of the universe” 
(p.29). Rather than locating empathy as an individual quality, participants described 
feeling as though empathy was a natural response to being a part of the world in which 
everything is connected: “(empathy is) expressed through us in relationship” (RE). 
This made empathy much less ego-bound; there was perhaps a shift towards what might 
be deemed a no-person psychology. This suggested Epstein’s (1995) letting go of the 
“spatial metaphor” (p.137) of the self, and in its place coming to experience the self as 
an ever-fluctuating process, anatta, or “no-self” (Rahula, 1959). As suggested by 
Suzuki (1970), “We say ‘inner world’ or ‘outer world’, but actually there is just one 
whole world… What we call ‘I’ is just a swinging door which moves when we inhale 
and when we exhale” (p.29). Participants seemed to construct the present moment of the 
therapeutic relationship not just as a moment of potential empathy, but of potential 
awakening. Empathy and awakening were essentially equated by participants as ways of 
realising interconnectedness. This is a very different perspective to the suggestion of 
object-relations theorists such as Hinshelwood (1989) that empathy is a form of 
projective identification.  
 Participants described the process of Trembling with the other as being 
simultaneously more connected and more separate. There was a sense of otherness and 
loss, and at the same time, a realisation of expansive interconnectedness. This evokes 
the Zen saying that “To go one mile to the west means to go back one mile to the east” 
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(as quoted in Suzuki, 1970, p.112), suggesting paradoxically that to realise separation 
equally means to realise interconnectedness, and vice versa. Mahler’s concept of 
rapprochement (Mahler, Pine, & Bergman, 1975) is helpful in understanding such a 
paradox; this is theorised to be the time in the infant’s life when they rediscover their 
mother after a period of testing out separation. The mother becomes experienced by the 
infant as separate, confronting the infant with their simultaneous vulnerability and 
magnificence. This period is then a time of rediscovering closeness with a separate 
other, and requires significant maturity to navigate. 
In Meeting the unknown, participants constructed a way of enquiring into the 
arising in-the-moment experience, emphasising that this was not undertaken with the 
intention of finding an answer in any absolute sense. This attitude of meditative 
questioning has been described by S. Batchelor (1990) as a way of “creat(ing) the initial 
fissure in the veil of the unknown” (p.37). He advocates for the importance of 
cultivating doubt through this questioning as a way of penetrating the mystery of life. 
Batchelor makes it clear that this is not intended to bring any kind of solution or answer, 
but rather that in his experience such enquiry continues to open him up to the “uncanny 
yet remarkably ordinary” (p.4) nature of being a part of this world.  
 Some participants spoke of a threshold between the known and the unknown, the 
self and other and that staying on this “‘just to be there’ threshold” (RE) was their 
intention in their practice; this was facilitated through the asking of unanswerable 
questions such as “Who is this I’m with?” (RE). There was something both mysterious 
and deeply uncomfortable about meeting the edge of knowing. As Buber (1958/2000) 
writes, “The moments of the Thou appear as strange lyric and dramatic episodes, 
seductive and magical, but tearing us away to dangerous extremes, loosening the well-
tried context, leaving more questions than satisfaction behind them, shattering security - 
in short, uncanny moments we can well dispense with” (p.44). One participant 
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suggested that these moments come from “dropping into the unknown, and not having 
an agenda” (HO), rather like Bion’s (1970) “ability to tolerate not knowing, the 
capacity to sit it out with a patient, often for long periods, without any real precision as 
to where we are” (p.187). Similarly, Moss et al. (2008) write about the “slipperiness” 
(p.133) of mindfulness, which they describe as a practice of “safe uncertainty” (p.132) 
in which control is relinquished in a supportive environment. 
 Trembling with the other evokes a sense of Freud’s (1912/1958) analytic attitude 
of “evenly hovering attention” (p.111), which Lacanian analyst Fink (2007) asserts is 
“part of our attempt to recognise the otherness of the other, the other’s difference from 
ourselves” (p.10). Lacan (1956/2006) himself urged his students, “Don’t try to 
understand!” (p.394) when listening to their patients. The phrase Trembling with the 
other also highlights an embodied responsiveness to the presence of the other, “a 
connectedness through our physicality” (AT). Participants described a tuning-in to their 
physical experiences, which evokes Winnicott’s (1960) suggestion that “The True Self 
comes from the aliveness of the body tissues and the working of body-functions, 
including the heart’s action and breathing… There is but little point in formulating a 
True Self idea except for the purpose of trying to understand the False Self, because it 
does no more than collect together the details of the experience of aliveness” (p.148). 
Winnicott argues that rather than being a set of personality traits that characterise one’s 
authentic nature, the true self simply cannot be defined in such terms; it is instead the 
experience of being alive, with particular emphasis on the aliveness of the body. One 
participant described this freedom from the constraints of a false self-construct as “an 
embodied experience of vulnerability and impermanence. The truth of non-self” (HE). 
 The category of Trembling with the other is broadly in line with other qualitative 
research on mindfulness and empathy; just as participants described letting go of their 
need to offer perfect empathy, Bihari and Mullan (2014) found that practicing 
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mindfulness helped individuals with depression to feel they could be with the other in 
their distress, rather than feeling the need to fix them. Cigolla and Brown (2011) 
discovered a process of learning how to tolerate the unknown in their study into how 
therapists bring mindfulness into their therapy practice. The common theme in these 
studies seems to be one of relinquishing an anxious drive to be in control and accepting 
uncertainty. In a study aiming to teach therapeutic presence through mindfulness 
training, McCollum and Gehart (2010) noted that participants described an increasing 
capacity to bring together their own internal awareness and awareness of the other. This 
seems related to participants in the current study taking a more intersubjective stance in 
letting go of the struggle to remain separate. What these other studies did not construct 
however, was the intertwining of the trembling openness with the defensive self-
construct. 
 
Relationship between categories 
The Möbius strip offered a way of constructing the relationship between Defending a 
fragile self and Trembling with the other that embraced paradox. This echoed Lacan’s 
(1966/2006) use of the Möbius strip to represent the intertwining of the conscious and 
the unconscious, and Grosz’s (1994) assertion that the tension produced by the 
continuous reconfiguration of dichotomous variables in a Möbius strip represents 
human subjectivity. The impossible form of a Möbius strip also aligns with Buddhist 
thought. S. Batchelor (1990) suggests that unawakened and awakened states co-exist 
simultaneously, while Suzuki (1970) writes that the zazen posture for meditation 
“expresses the oneness of duality: not two, and not one… Our life is not only plural, but 
also singular. Each one of us is both dependent and independent” (p.25). This paradox 
fits the way in which participants constructed empathy as both Defending a fragile self 
and Trembling with the other. Moss and Barnes (2008) suggest that practicing 
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mindfulness involves being confronted with both tangibility and intangibility at the 
same time, which is a reflection of the way in which life is an inextricable intertwining 
of presence and absence. Mindful awareness brings the practitioner at once closer to 
their own embodied experience, and at the same time draws attention to that which 
cannot be grasped. Participants seemed to express this paradox in the interview itself by 
describing two ways of being in relationship at the same time; they did not neatly 
progress from one to the other, or swing between them depending on context; the 
Möbius strip also brought to mind Winnicott’s (1953) transitional space, which is 
something both interior and exterior, self and other. In empathy participants seemed to 
express that part of themselves was “not-me”, and part of the other was “me”, and in 
doing so dwelt in a twilight space. This echoes Epstein’s (1995) suggestion that mindful 
awareness itself is a form of transitional space. 
  
Ensuring quality 
Several checks and measures were undertaken with the aim of ensuring methodological 
rigour. Elliott and Lazenbatt (2005) advise being open to revising theoretical 
constructions in the light of newly generated ideas, and highlight the importance of 
concurrent data collection and constant comparative analysis, theoretical sampling, and 
memo-writing as being essential to good quality grounded theory research. Attention 
was paid to all three of these parts of the research process to ensure the methods as 
outlined by Charmaz (2006) were being applied rigorously. Suddaby (2006) emphasises 
the importance of acknowledging the existing literature when undertaking grounded 
theory research, suggesting that while it is undesirable to force the data into pre-existing 
ideas, it is vain to ignore the field as it stands. I tried to find a balance between reading 
existing theory while keeping an open mind by only consulting the literature once my 
categories had been partially constructed. For example, as participants began to speak 
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about using empathy to heal old wounds, I began to read up on the false self and 
narcissistic injury in the object-relations and self psychology schools. Suddaby (2006) 
also warns against methodological slurring, which occurs through a lack of clarity in 
using grounded theory in a positivist way. I tried to ensure that my social constructionist 
stance was woven through all aspects of my work, and thought about how my choices of 
what literature I focused on were guided by both the data and my own interests and 
values. Charmaz (2006) suggests that grounded theory research can be evaluated with 
reference to four criteria: credibility, originality, resonance and usefulness. Credibility 
was ensured through my familiarity with the topic (I’ve been immersed in the worlds of 
psychotherapy and mindfulness for several years), and through a comprehensive 
inclusion of data in my write-up to support my constructions. I would argue that my 
study is original, in that it constructs a new way of understanding empathy that has not 
been studied in any depth previously, while developing and expanding the assertion of 
the object-relations theorists that empathy is a form of projective identification (e.g. 
Hinshelwood, 1989). This study also presents a new integration of psychoanalytic 
theory and Buddhist teaching. The resonance of the study comes from the fullness of the 
theoretical constructions which draw on subtle meanings, and in the study’s potential to 
offer therapists who practice mindfulness some insight into how they may be 
constructing their relationships with clients. This could be useful in their everyday 
clinical practice, as well as in providing various starting points for future research into 
mindfulness practice and empathy. 
 
Limitations and critique 
One criticism of this study could be that in my failure to transcribe or code for emotion 
in voice, length of pauses or level of intelligibility, I was limited in what meaning could 
be constructed. As Lacan (1956/2006) suggests, “May one of your ears become as deaf 
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as the other one must be acute. And that is the one that you should lend to listen for 
sounds and phonemes, words, locutions, and sentences, not forgetting pauses, scansions, 
cuts, periods and parallelisms” (p.394). I coded the contents of my participants’ speech 
and actions, but did not pay as much attention to the particularities of how they spoke or 
the spaces between words. This is arguably problematic as it precludes some aspects of 
participants’ experience from the analysis. This meant that I lost the opportunity to 
construct an understanding more deeply rooted in the symbolic, with a greater potential 
for picking up and making sense of unconscious material. In a paper making 
connections between Lacanian psychoanalysis and qualitative research, Vanheule 
(2002) asserts that a symbolic relationship with data must be cultivated which maintains 
the focus on the signifiers and the relationships between signifiers. In order to bring into 
focus such subtleties of meaning, a careful and discerning approach is required. Seale 
and Silverman (1997) for example recommend transcribing interviews in a manner 
informed by conversation analysis, arguing that doing so can offer the opportunity to 
find radically different meanings and bring greater reliability and validity to research. 
Moss and Barnes (2008) treat their qualitative data as “footprints”, which they suggest 
are “the passing trace of something live, a trace of a moment that has already passed, 
beyond grasping, intangible” (p.18). This way of engaging with data expresses a 
mindful approach to research, through which nothing is fully fixed or tangible, but 
rather vividly fluctuating.  
Osborne (2013) argues that the researcher’s own experience of meditation 
practice will inform how able they are to recognise the presence of enlightenment in 
others. I was painfully aware of my own limits at times in the research process (and 
undoubtedly there were also many times where I was not conscious of those limits), as I 
strained to construct an understanding of my participants’ accounts of their empathic 
experiences. As some of my participants had been meditating intensively for decades, 
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with experiences of participating in Buddhist traditions in Eastern countries where the 
culture around meditation is hugely different, my capacity to recognise and identify 
their experiences was at times limited.  
 Although this was at least partially addressed with ongoing researcher 
reflexivity, another potential issue for me was over-identifying with my participants. 
Akin to an over-identification in the countertransference (e.g. Eleftheriadou, 1999), such 
a concern needs serious consideration. Vanheule (2002) suggests that the researcher’s 
desire (perhaps for knowledge) can result in an imaginary relationship with their data 
characterised by illusion: the fascinating mirror from which a deluded identity is 
formed. Rizq (2008) suggests that the process of identifying with the participant’s 
vulnerability and the subsequent narcissistic dynamic of mutual agreement may mean 
that the researcher’s guilty and anxious feelings about difference and conflict are 
repressed. This unconscious conflict could result in the researcher feeling resistance to 
the analysis and dissemination phases of their research process or a taking a sterile and 
conflict-free descriptive rather than interpretative approach to engaging with their data. 
Rizq describes the researcher’s painful dilemma as being “confronted not only with the 
technical issue of balancing the voice of the participant with his or her own 
interpretative stance, but with the emotional dilemma of how to retain their own 
perspective and analytic position whilst sustaining a meaningful, empathic 
intersubjective relationship with participants that does not infringe either the 
researcher’s or participants’ sense of self” (p.44). This was something I struggled with 
at times, as taking an interpretative stance felt imbued with aggression, and I can only 
hope that through making use of supervision and memo-writing processes I was able to 
sufficiently separate from my data to say something new. This may have mirrored my 
participants’ struggle to remain separate and the pull towards an empathy with no gap 
between self and other. 
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Many of my participants were trained in Core-Process psychotherapy (Sills, 
2009). This training will undoubtedly have had a strong influence on the way in which 
my participants practiced meditation, and how they constructed their meditative and 
therapeutic experiences. Equally, if I had interviewed more MBSR trained therapists, or 
found therapists from other trainings that integrate psychotherapy and Buddhist-
informed meditation practices, my theoretical constructions may have been very 
different. While this is in line with my social constructionist stance, the study’s 
emphasis on participants from a particular training background bears mentioning. 
 
Implications 
The grounded theory outlined above indicates that the practices of meditation and 
psychotherapy do not inherently lead to freedom from narcissism and defensiveness. 
Participants seem to maintain an idealised self-construct based around their capacity for 
empathy. The danger could be that when participants unquestioningly assume that they 
are capable of providing their clients with an ideal form of empathy, it could potentially 
perpetuate a collusive transference and countertransference dynamic that prevents the 
client from moving forward. What might be particularly problematic is if this 
defensiveness remains unconscious. The implications of this are that therapists may be 
acting out on their own unmet needs in their choice of career and unconsciously 
attempting to meet those needs in their relationships with their clients. The way in 
which participants spoke much more about their strong capacities for empathy than their 
moments of empathic failure implied that the focus was more on gratifying the client, 
and less on empowering the client to learn how to meet their own needs. This will have 
been influenced by the power dynamics in the interview between participants and 
myself, and it’s possible that this resulted in a greater level of defensiveness than in 
their relationships with clients. However, it may also suggest that the client’s attempts 
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to separate or express aggression towards their therapist were not adequately mirrored. 
Hardy (1979) suggested that this can result in denying the client’s independence, 
misunderstanding the client and discouraging a negative transference. It would be 
difficult to really understand the other from a place of idealised symbiosis and 
omnipotence, as the client may need the therapist to feel empty, impotent, and devalued 
in the countertransference. If the therapist is defended against these feelings, they will 
remain unconscious and thus unavailable for thinking and talking about with the client.   
 Perhaps Defending a fragile self relates to the concept of compassion fatigue, 
which Figley (2002) suggested is the cost of empathically engaging with others in the 
helping profession. Defending a fragile self seemed to require participants to expend a 
great deal of psychic energy, seemingly in maintaining the identification with an ideal 
and in struggling to remain separate. It would not be a great leap to suggest that this 
could lead eventually to therapists becoming depleted and burnt out. Although it might 
appear that empathy towards others leads to becoming overwhelmed, it strikes me that 
such a burnout would occur through Defending a fragile self and not Trembling with the 
other. This latter way of experiencing empathy seems less entrenched in an omnipotent 
desire to heal the other’s suffering but involves a much more humble connection with 
the moment-to-moment intersubjective experience. This appeared to be less depleting 
for participants, with some suggesting that it was actually an energising form of psycho-
spiritual practice. Thus Trembling with the other could feasibly support therapists in 
their day-to-day work in remaining engaged and resilient in the face of difficult 
conditions. 
 The construction of empathy as Defending a fragile self perhaps also plays a part 
in current discourses regarding mindfulness in the wider culture. Turnbull and Dawson 
(2006) suggest that in Buddhism’s contact with Western society’s dominant ideologies 
of neoliberalism and individualism, with their inherent focus on objectification, 
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commodification and narcissism, the practice of mindfulness is being distorted to 
bolster a narcissistic search for individual happiness, rather than dealing with the root 
issue of suffering and its cessation. Similarly, Crane et al. (2012) fear a “dilution of 
integrity” (p.76) in mindfulness-based interventions. This suggests a growing awareness 
that mindfulness can be co-opted to shore up the fragile self, rather than radically 
challenge its reality. 
 Another implication is that meditation practice may support the capacity for 
Trembling with the other, potentially through the development of ego strength (Epstein, 
1995), or through building self-compassion (Shapiro et al., 2007) which might 
subsequently translate into empathy for others. Such suggestions would be in line with 
existing research that indicates that practicing mindfulness impacts on the capacity for 
empathy (Shapiro et al., 1998; Lesh, 1970). Supporting such a claim would have 
implications for many contexts in which empathy is lacking, suggesting that meditation 
practice can bring profound change to relationships. For therapists, this seems to offer 
the possibility of creating a more equal power balance in their relationships with clients. 
This could transform conflicts at the individual level, but also perhaps as meditation 
becomes increasingly integrated into Western culture, at the wider societal level. 
 This study also had implications for counselling psychologists undertaking 
research. Counselling psychology is rooted in principles of intersubjectivity, 
empowerment and relational context (Cooper, 2009), but it has been argued that 
qualitative research in counselling psychology has drifted from these principles over 
time (Hoyt & Bhati, 2007) and “researchers may be unknowingly ‘postpositivizing’ 
constructivist qualitative methods, which is akin to forcing a round peg into a square 
hole” (Ponterotto, 2005, p.127). In attempting to measure what can’t be measured and 
fit into the predominant scientific paradigm, the scope of counselling psychology to 
advance the research field has been diminished. In reviewing the literature there were 
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very few rigorous qualitative studies on experiences of empathy that were 
epistemologically sound. I would therefore argue that there is a need to retain a greater 
epistemological coherence in counselling psychology research, which builds on the 
principles of qualitative enquiry (e.g. Devereux, 1967). 
 This study also has implications for grounded theory methods. The unconscious 
tends not to be acknowledged in grounded theory research, perhaps because it seems to 
imply essentialism and moving beyond the data. However, this can be avoided by 
acknowledging the unconscious itself to be a theoretical construct, albeit one with a 
profound power to open up new meanings. I would argue that it is useful to have 
unconscious motivations in mind when conducting grounded theory research, as these 
are likely to influence the constructions which develop in the research process. Leaving 
the unconscious out of our theoretical constructions leads us to ignore the instances in 
which participants contradict themselves, make slips or in other ways reveal “the 
strangeness buried in ordinary thought and language, an eerie otherness that daily 
speech conceals” (Cohen, 2013, p.24). In paying close attention to what participants are 
saying, to their actions, and to this eerie otherness woven through their words, we can 
begin to construct understandings with much greater richness and depth. This deeper 
level of analysis would make grounded theory a particularly appropriate method for 
psychoanalytic research. 
 There were some inherent tensions in conceptualising and writing about 
experiences of Trembling with the other, which was constructed as a moment-by-
moment, non-verbal, experiential process. As Osborne (2013) notes, using language to 
represent and conceptualise an embodied experience of interconnectedness is perhaps a 
fundamentally doomed endeavour. There was a tension for me in using the grounded 
theory method to explore these intangible and non-verbal empathic experiences due to 
the method’s reliance on language to construct processes. In coding the data, gerunds 
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were used to capture a particular action, through representing it as a verb functioning as 
a noun (e.g. “listening”). Initially I felt this use of the gerund seemed to imply the 
existence of a subject (i.e. the one doing the listening) and an object (i.e. the one being 
listened to), while social constructionism, a Western epistemological stance, seems to 
necessitate the assumed presence of an individual actor. However, at points these 
assumptions were challenged by participants who deconstructed a distinction between 
self and other.  As S. Batchelor (1990) suggests, “Buddha-nature can never stand before 
one as though it were a grammatical object connected by means of an act (verb) to 
oneself (subject)” (p.78). This challenged me to tread lightly with the assumption that 
listening required a listener. In making this shift, the emphasis turns to the actions or 
processes themselves. With no need to hypothesise an actor or an acted upon, these 
processes can simply be understood, as Epstein (1995) puts it, as “thoughts without a 
thinker” (p.41). This supported Hosking (2011) in suggesting that social 
constructionism (and for me, grounded theory) can be highly compatible with studying 
Buddhist-informed practices and experiences that deconstruct notions of an individual 
self, such as emptiness and no-self (e.g. Rahula, 1959).  
Similarly, Trembling with the other could have implications for researchers. 
Mindfulness practice, which cultivates a “beginner’s mind” (Suzuki, 1970, p.21), could 
prove helpful as an attitude to hold in qualitative research in counselling psychology. 
Conducting such research requires the researcher to manage a great deal of uncertainty 
in taking a non-expert stance, something that Cushman and Gilford (2000) argue has 
been increasingly defended against in contemporary positivist research. To tremble with 
a participant might mean opening oneself up to new meanings outside of comfortable 
expectations.  
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Recommendations for practice 
The findings of the current study indicate the dangers of unidentified narcissistic 
defences in clinical work. It seems important for therapists to be aware of defensively 
identifying with an ideal, as well as the tendency to create an enfeebled other. 
Therapists might benefit from reflecting on the narcissistic needs which can 
unconsciously drive their therapeutic relationships. Bringing these needs into 
awareness, reducing shame about them, and finding ways of talking about these issues 
is vital for ethical practice. This research suggests that personal therapy during training, 
and regular meditation practice may not be sufficient to alert therapists to their own 
narcissism. Perhaps the therapists of trainee therapists should be selected at least 
partially on their experience and training in working with issues of narcissism.  
 Furthermore, if even after training therapists are unconsciously driven in their 
practice by narcissistic needs, there must be opportunities for these needs to be explored 
and at least partially met in settings outside of relationships with clients. Therapists need 
to be trembled along with, perhaps by their supervisors, personal therapists, trainers and 
Dharma teachers. These people must be real to us, acknowledging their own limits and 
vulnerabilities rather than existing as mere fantasies of ideal parents. This could mean 
encouraging therapists to engage in an open enquiry into their narcissistic needs, 
supported by people who have cultivated an empathy of trembling with. This could be 
through silent retreats or other opportunities which provide the space for this enquiry to 
take place, something sorely lacking in the busy clinical environments in which most 
therapists practice. 
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Recommendations for future research 
Investigating the potential link between Defending a fragile self and compassion fatigue 
(e.g. Figley, 2002) would be valuable to better understand the conditions which can lead 
therapists to experience depletion and burnout. If more evidence accrues for such a 
connection, it would lead to practical recommendations regarding bringing mindfulness 
practice into the workplace.  
 Participants with extensive and intensive meditation experience did seem to be 
particularly associated with constructions of empathy as trembling with the other, which 
suggests that individuals with these meditation experiences offer rich opportunities for 
learning. Further research could ask questions about what aspects of meditation practice 
bring out the capacity to tremble with the other, and it would be valuable to explore the 
impact of meditation practice on narcissistic injury. Perhaps such qualitative research 
could transcribe, code and analyse data in a way that offered greater potential for 
understanding the embodied, non-verbal and unconscious aspects of communication. 
 Further research could focus on the experiences of clients of therapists with a 
meditation practice. It would be interesting to understand how clients construct empathy 
in their relationships with their therapists, and whether they too experience the 
therapist’s empathy as both defensive and open. Exploring how clients respond to a 
therapist’s narcissism would be valuable in bringing awareness to an under-researched 
phenomenon that could feasibly have a great impact on the therapy; equally, exploring 
how clients respond to being trembled along with would be fascinating. The latter 
would be especially so, given that clients’ experiences of empathy would not be 
necessarily grounded in the same conceptual framework as those of therapists.  
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Conclusion 
 
An empathy rooted in narcissism gives birth to a trembling alongside, collapsing back in 
an endless series of contractions and expansions, stuttering forthrightly in all directions 
of space and time simultaneously. Perhaps these movements are rather shifts in 
perception: when viewed from one angle, empathy is an attempt to shore up a fragile 
self, while from another it is a beautifully embodied opening to the unknown. There 
seems to be no one without the other, indicating that empathy can never be pure tremble 
and will always be clouded and at times obscured by a veil of defensive self-
construction. However, what this suggests is that the potential to tremble with is never 
truly lost; there is always the possibility of resting in the mystery and tenderness of the 
intention to know that which can never be made solid or tangible, that which we might 
call the self in the other or the other in the self, striking such distinctions dumb in a 
profoundly alive silence. Empathy is vainglorious and deluded selfishness; empathy is 
knowing the awful freedom of a boundless space. 
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Appendix one – Participant demographics 
Participant 
ID 
Gender Profession Primary relevant training 
MN Female Psychotherapist Core Process 
psychotherapy / Somatic 
Experiencing 
GB Male Psychotherapist Core Process 
psychotherapy 
SQ Female Psychotherapist Integrative psychotherapy 
PL Female Clinical psychologist / 
Dharma teacher 
Clinical psychology 
AD Female Psychotherapist / Focusing 
teacher 
Core Process 
psychotherapy / Focusing 
HO Female Psychotherapist  Core Process 
psychotherapy 
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DM Male Psychotherapist / Dharma 
teacher / Ex-monk 
Core Process 
psychotherapy 
LS Female Psychotherapist  Integrative counselling and 
psychotherapy 
RE Female Psychotherapist / Dharma 
teacher / Ex-nun 
Core Process 
psychotherapy 
AT Female MBSR teacher and trainer MBSR teaching 
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Appendix two – Demographics of participants from prior study on 
countertransference and mindfulness (Millon & Halewood, 2015) 
Participant 
ID 
Gender Profession Primary relevant training 
JG Female Counsellor / Trainee 
Counselling Psychologist 
Person-centred counselling / 
Counselling psychology 
SM Female Counsellor / MBSR teacher Psychodynamic counselling / 
MBSR teaching 
BD Female Counsellor / 
Psychotherapist 
Acceptance and Commitment 
Therapy / Psychoanalytic 
psychotherapy 
HE Female Dramatherapist Dramatherapy 
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Appendix seven – Article prepared for submission to Psychodynamic Practice 
 
Defending a fragile self: How therapists who practice mindfulness construct 
empathy 
 
Abstract 
Understandings and usages of empathy have long-been contested between different 
schools of the psychoanalytic tradition; empathy has been constructed as a form of 
projective identification, a means of healing narcissistic injury, and a defence against 
otherness. As teachings and practices from Buddhism have become increasingly 
integrated into Western therapeutic approaches, the practice of mindfulness may be 
informing how therapists experience and make sense of empathy. In exploring how 
mindfulness practitioners construct the process of empathy within the therapeutic 
relationship, this study aims to address some of the gaps in current understanding. 14 
therapists who practiced mindfulness were interviewed about their empathic 
experiences, and the data was analysed using a social constructionist form of grounded 
theory. The grounded theory constructed from the data suggested two categories 
involved in the process of empathy: Defending a fragile self and Trembling with the 
other, of which only the former is presented here. Defending a fragile self was 
constructed as an identification with an empathic ideal and a struggle to remain 
separate. This suggestion that the practice of empathy can be used to protect the 
vulnerable self-construct has implications for therapists’ practice regarding the 
therapeutic relationship. The grounded theory also pointed to a different construction of 
empathy that seemed rooted in insights from mindfulness practice. This trembling with 
the other was characterised by participants acknowledging their own lack, a realising of 
interconnectedness and being willing to meet the unknown. 
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Key words: empathy, mindfulness, grounded theory, narcissism, therapeutic 
relationship, projective identification 
 
Introduction 
Empathy occupies an uneasy place in the theory and practice of psychotherapy. 
Ensconced at the heart of some traditions yet rejected by others, the construct of 
empathy has been both glorified and denigrated; furthermore, different theorists 
emphasise different aspects of empathy, situating it in the broader context of their ways 
of understanding human experience. Buddhist teachings and practices introduced to the 
West (e.g. Hanh, 1975; Suzuki, 1970) have developed into the movement of 
mindfulness that has increasingly been integrated into psychological therapies (e.g. 
Kabat-Zinn, 1990); the practice of which fosters an empathy that is constructed as a 
‘trembling along with’ the tremble of the other (Keown, 2003, p.15). 
 There is at present a gap in the literature in terms of qualitative explorations of 
therapists’ constructions of empathy, and more specifically the constructions of 
therapists with a mindfulness practice. This study aims to address these gaps by looking 
at how mindfulness practitioners construct the process of empathy within the 
therapeutic relationship.  
 
Psychoanalytic constructions of empathy 
Freud uses the word Einfühlung, which was translated in some instances by Strachey as 
‘sympathetic understanding’ (Freud, 1913/1962, p.140), and in others as ‘empathy’ 
(Freud 1921/1955, p.110) to indicate the non-moralising attitude that plays ‘the largest 
part in our understanding of what is inherently foreign to our ego in other people’ 
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(Freud 1921/1955, p.66). Although it was not a subject on which he wrote prolifically, 
Freud (1921/1955) attempts to formulate Einfühlung as a meaningful concept with his 
suggestion that, ‘A path leads from identification by way of imitation to empathy, that 
is, to the comprehension of the mechanism by means of which we are enabled to take up 
any attitude at all towards another mental life’ (p.110).  
 Building on this, Klein’s concept of projective identification (1952) suggests 
that empathy is possible through projecting a part of the self into another, in order to 
understand their inner experience as if from within. Hinshelwood (1989) posits that 
loving relationships can transform the defence mechanism of projective identification 
into a benign form, while Torres de Beà (1989) goes as far as stating that projective 
identification is the single most important mechanism in all human interaction, from the 
healthy and empathic to the disturbed and pathological. 
 Kohut’s self psychology (1984) emphasises the importance of the therapist’s 
capacity to communicate their empathic understanding to the patient in an experience-
near manner; empathy is the means through which a therapist can come to know their 
patient’s unmet developmental needs. Kohut suggests that these needs surface in the 
therapeutic relationship through the emergence of the mirroring transference and the 
idealising transference, in which the patient sees the therapist as someone capable of 
valuing them for who they are, or someone who can be looked up to. In this way the 
therapist becomes a ‘self-object’ (Kohut, 1971/2009, p.25), an external person who 
serves an essential role in maintaining the patient’s functioning sense of self. Kohut 
(1984) argues that the therapist’s empathy provides the patient with the way of healing 
wounds from early experiences of not being understood or validated by their parents.  
Kohut (1971/2009) also emphasises the importance of the therapist’s empathic 
failures; as long as the failure is not catastrophic it can serve as an ‘optimal frustration’ 
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(p.49), a disappointment that is sufficiently tolerable to offer the patient the opportunity 
to provide the empathy they needed by and for themselves. Kohut (1971/2009) terms 
this process a ‘transmuting internalisation’ (p.74), an internalising of the therapist’s 
empathic presence, which was what he argues helps the patient to develop a cohesive 
sense of self. 
While the construct of empathy has been theorised and its importance 
emphasised to varying degrees in different psychoanalytic traditions, in other quarters it 
has been more radically challenged. French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan (1949/2006) 
suggests that the need for empathy has its origins in a particular stage of infancy, which 
he referred to as the mirror phase. Lacan argued that the infant is confronted with a 
painful and chaotic experience of its own un-coordinated and fragmented bodily 
experience; in response to this, the infant develops a sense of self through seeing its own 
reflected image, either through a looking glass or in the imitations of caregivers or 
peers, thus gaining a degree of control over their body. Lacan thus argues that empathy 
was established as an identification based on illusion which could only perpetuate a 
sense of alienation; this suggests that any attempt by the therapist to offer empathy to 
the patient will only alienate them further from themselves and their surroundings. 
Lacan (1955/2006) suggests that a therapist attempting to provide their patient with 
empathy is engaging in a form of ‘connivance’ (p.282), a refusal to acknowledge the 
otherness of the patient which Lacan argues inexcusably undermines the analytic 
process. Parker (2003), a Lacanian analyst, asserts that ‘The attainment of empathy 
serves to sabotage what is most radical about psychoanalysis, for the sense that one has 
empathised with another serves to make them the same as oneself… Against this 
reduction to the level of ‘imaginary’ identification, the task of the Lacanian 
psychoanalyst is ‘to obtain absolute difference’’ (p.58). Some Lacanians (e.g. Safouan, 
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1980) go so far as to suggest that through empathy the analyst is actually gazing upon 
their own self-image as reflected back to them through their patient. 
 
Mindfulness and empathy 
Of all Buddhist teaching, it is mindfulness that has most fully taken root in the West, 
coming to be defined as the ‘paying attention in a particular way: on purpose, in the 
present and non-judgmentally’ (Kabat-Zinn, 1994, p.4). Originally outlined in the sutta 
entitled ‘The Foundations of Mindfulness’ (Majjhima Nikāya 10: Satipaṭṭhāna-sutta), 
the Buddha gives instruction to his Bhikkhus, or monks, on the practice of mindfulness 
in terms of finding a quiet place, sitting down with the legs crossed and the back 
straight, and bringing mindful awareness to the experience of breathing. He advises this 
practice as a way of observing the activities of the body and how the nature of bodily 
sensation is to arise and cease. Through bringing awareness to this ongoing flux of 
sensation in the breathing body, the Buddha reflects that this also cultivates awareness 
to impermanence in a wider sense, in that we all age, get sick and die. This is perhaps to 
be considered at the heart of mindfulness practice. 
 Mindfulness is now often practiced in a secular form that can have applications 
outside a religious context (e.g. Batchelor, 1997), while attempting to retain an 
underpinning of awareness and insight into the true nature of reality (Gunaratana, 2002). 
Interest in mindfulness as a therapy is increasing rapidly, with new approaches 
emerging that are either directly based on its practices (e.g. Mindfulness-Based Stress 
Reduction [MBSR], Kabat-Zinn, 1990); or informed by its philosophy and precepts 
(e.g. Acceptance and Commitment Therapy, Hayes & Smith, 2005). Research on MBSR 
in particular (e.g. Baer, 2003) has led to its becoming increasingly perceived as an 
‘evidence-based’ therapy in Western society. This has resulted in the promotion of 
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mindfulness as a treatment for particular individuals with certain symptoms or 
diagnoses, and the attempt to measure change using outcome measures, an approach 
that has its critics (e.g. Moss, Waugh & Barnes, 2008; Bazzano, 2015). Mindfulness is 
also an integral part of several psychotherapy trainings, including Core-Process (Sills, 
2009) and Hakomi (Kurtz, 1990) psychotherapies. 
 
Research on mindfulness and empathy 
In a quantitative study, medical students who participated in a mindfulness-based stress 
reduction (MBSR) course of eight weeks self-reported an increase in empathy that was 
statistically greater than that of a control group (Shapiro, Schwartz & Bonner, 1998). 
Similarly, a within-subjects study conducted by Lesh (1970) suggested that a 4-week 
training in Zen meditation increases empathy in counselling psychology students and 
that participants with initially low capacities for empathy attain the greatest gains. 
Studies conducted by Paul Ekman (reported in Goleman, 2003) suggest that Buddhist 
monks are significantly more accurate in detecting small changes in facial expressions 
of emotions than many other groups considered to be expert at emotion detection 
(including secret service agents). 
 Several qualitative studies have explored the link between mindfulness and 
empathy. In a grounded theory study, Bihari and Mullan (2014) interviewed individuals 
with a history of depression who had participated in an 8-week mindfulness-based 
cognitive therapy group. Findings suggest that following the group, participants 
experienced themselves as developing an increased tendency to be with rather than fix 
other people in distress. In a thematic analysis study, Hopkins and Proeve (2013) found 
that after undergoing training in mindfulness, trainee psychologists described a 
lessening of performance anxiety, a greater awareness of their own responses and an 
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enhanced capacity to communicate empathy towards their clients. In a study using 
grounded theory methods, Millon and Halewood (2015) explored the 
countertransference experiences of psychotherapists who engaged in a personal 
mindfulness practice. Findings indicated that participants believed they were 
increasingly able to tolerate difficult countertransference responses, such as anger, fear 
or boredom, opening up the possibility of using these responses in the service of 
empathically understanding their clients. 
 
The present study  
As empathy has been theorised to be such an important aspect of the therapeutic 
relationship (e.g. Kohut, 1984), and its construction is now being informed by teachings 
and practices from Buddhism (e.g. Epstein, 1995), a very different cultural tradition, it 
is timely to think about how this cross-pollination may be influencing how empathy is 
both experienced and understood. In exploring how mindfulness practitioners construct 
the process of empathy within the therapeutic relationship, this study aims to address 
some of the current gaps in understanding, while undoubtedly raising further questions. 
 
Methodology 
Design 
This is a qualitative study which utilises a social constructionist grounded theory 
methodology (Charmaz, 2006) and unstructured interviews to explore how therapists 
who practice mindfulness meditation construct the process of empathy within the 
therapeutic relationship. Full ethical approval was granted by the University of the West 
of England ethics committee. 
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Rationale for Grounded Theory 
Grounded theory was adopted because of its potential to go beyond description and 
towards theory generation (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). This study is based on social 
constructionist epistemological assumptions (Charmaz, 2006), with the aim of exploring 
how participants create meaning in their experiences of empathy. Although empathy has 
been constructed in various theoretical traditions, very little of this has been based on 
qualitative research. Furthermore, most existing theories of empathy are not grounded in 
data gathered from therapy practitioners, and there is very little research that explores 
the assumptions underpinning empathy as it is constructed within Western society. 
 
Participants 
Ten psychotherapists, psychologists, and mindfulness trainers who had a regular 
mindfulness meditation practice participated in the study. Additional data was used 
from a further four participants who were interviewed for a prior research study 
conducted by the researcher (Millon and Halewood, 2015). These participants were also 
therapists with a mindfulness meditation practice. Although this prior study focussed on 
countertransference rather than empathy specifically, the therapeutic relationship and 
constructions of empathy within the interviews made the data highly pertinent to the 
present study. 
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Procedure  
Sampling 
Snowball sampling was used to recruit participants through my existing professional 
contacts and those of my supervisors. Midway into the project, theoretical sampling was 
used to recruit and interview three therapists who were also Dharma teachers, 
individuals with highly extensive and intensive meditation experience who had 
undergone training in Buddhist centres in order to learn how to pass on Buddhist 
teaching themselves. The reason for seeking this additional data was because previous 
participants had spoken about what they had learned about empathy from people trained 
as Dharma teachers, suggesting that with decades of meditating came a particular depth 
of awareness, kindness and humility. With the hope of generating new ideas and 
refining my tentative categories (Charmaz, 2012), I recruited three participants through 
the websites of Buddhist retreat centres for teachers who were also trained 
psychotherapists or psychologists. By searching an online repository of Buddhist 
teachings for talks given on the subject of on empathy, I found two talks given by 
Dharma teachers (Brach, 2012; Weber, 2015) which I transcribed and selectively coded.  
Dey (1999) suggests that theoretical sufficiency, the point at which data 
collection stops, is achieved when no further ideas are generated. I was critical of this as 
my experience was that ideas continued to arise throughout the research process, and 
that the rationale for stopping sampling and data collection was based on time 
constraints. I do not believe it would ever have been possible for ideas to cease 
generating in the face of new data due to the ‘unstoppable signifying process’ (Bowie, 
1991, p.185) through which meaning is endlessly constructed in our lives, never 
reaching a fixed endpoint. 
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The research interview 
Individual hour-long unstructured interviews were conducted. I chose to set an intention 
for the focus of the interview by asking one initial question: ‘How do you experience 
empathy?’. Participants were encouraged to explore their associations, reflections and 
any specific examples from their practice. The reason for only asking the one question 
was to encourage an open and non-directive relationship with the participant and their 
discourse in order to support the emergence of their own meanings. In acknowledging 
my difference from my participants, I saw it as my role to pay close attention to how 
participants constructed empathy in their own unique ways, rather than forcing my own 
constructions upon them. In practice, this meant at times providing an alternative 
punctuation to the participant’s discourse, a punctuation that could produce new 
meanings (Fink, 2007) by virtue of the difference between our perspectives. This 
sometimes involved asking the participant to expand on a particular point, or gently 
bringing the participant’s awareness to instances where they contradicted themselves or 
trailed off mid-thought. 
 
Data analysis 
Interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed in full. The interview transcripts were 
then analysed following the steps of the grounded theory method which involved 
multiple stages of analysis, starting with line-by-line open coding. The gerund, a verb 
that functions as a noun, was used for all coding. This ‘builds action right into the 
codes’ (Charmaz, 2012, p.5), offering a way of coding subtle actions and processes that 
could otherwise be easily missed. A second layer of coding was more interpretive and 
‘focused’. New codes were created to encapsulate others, gradually resulting in the 
construction of categories. The use of the constant comparison method (Charmaz, 2006) 
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meant that throughout the research process, early interviews were used to develop 
tentative constructions, with subsequent interviews being coded with these constructions 
in mind, ensuring a close fit with the data and forcing an in-depth examination of how 
meanings might subtly differ and relate to one another. This meant comparing data with 
other data, data with codes, codes with other codes, codes with categories, categories 
with other categories, categories with data, and the analysis as a whole with existing 
theory and research (Charmaz, 2012). As suggested by Charmaz (2006), data analysis 
took place concurrently with interviewing, whereby each process informed the other. I 
maintained an awareness of how my theoretical construction was just one of an infinite 
number of potential interpretations of the data (Dey, 2007).  
Throughout the research process, I wrote memos as a record of my ideas and 
responses. Sometimes memos took the form of emotional responses to interviews with 
different participants, or intellectual responses to ideas expressed by participants. Other 
memos expressed ideas or fantasies in response to a specific code or the state of the 
project in general. Memos were also written to explore the nature of relationships 
between all my constructions. I wanted to bring elements of post-structuralism to my 
reflexivity; to me this meant attempting to write my own ‘lack and ruin’ (Lather, 2000, 
p.22) into the work as a whole. 
 
Analysis 
Two main categories were constructed from the data: Defending a fragile self and 
Trembling with the other. The relationship between the two categories was represented 
as a Möbius strip (see Figure 1). For the purpose of this article I have chosen to present 
solely the first category due to the constraints of the format. 
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The first category, Defending a fragile self, describes the way in which 
participants appeared to construct their identities around an empathic ideal; there was an 
assumption that they were able to perfectly understand their clients, as if there was no 
gap between them. This seemed to shore up a sense of the self as inherently good, while 
more difficult experiences got disavowed and the client was constructed as needy and 
lacking. Within this construction of empathy, participants seemed to feel afraid of being 
overwhelmed by the other and losing their sense of self. This resulted in a struggle to 
remain separate, through which a firm boundary was maintained between self and other. 
This was justified as being in the interests of the client. 
The second category, Trembling with the other, describes participants’ 
acknowledgement that they lacked the capacity to offer an ideal empathy, and that there 
were always limits to what they could know or control. Participants described a 
realisation that all is interconnected, which softened the boundaries between self and 
other. In doing so, participants constructed empathy as an intersubjective process 
between themselves and the other; this cultivated more mutual power dynamics with 
clients. Participants appeared to develop an intuitive, embodied relationship with an 
empathy that could not be fixed down or made tangible; there was a meeting the 
unknown which entailed a trembling with the mystery of the other. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
163 
Figure 1 – How empathy is constructed by therapists who practice mindfulness 
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Defending a fragile self 
Identifying with an empathic ideal 
It seemed important for participants to identify themselves as an ideal provider of 
empathy, a being of infinite and unconditional love and generosity. This identification 
seemed to initially proceed through a relationship with an idealised other who was 
endowed with authority and often held a social role such as a teacher, therapist or monk. 
Idealised others were not only experienced as powerful on the basis of their position in 
society, but were felt to possess particular qualities which many participants appeared to 
feel they themselves lacked:  
 
‘I remember once ten years ago, being at a talk of a very senior Buddhist monk, 
and just being incredibly impressed at how when this person was talking about 
their emotional reality, they just knew it in such an embodied way. They knew 
their own internal tides, and how different emotions tasted and operated inside 
themselves, and how they would react and manifest in response and hand-in-
hand with what was going on with them emotionally and somatically. And yeah, 
I remember thinking, “this is where that process takes you”.’ GB 
 
Empathy was constructed as a magical food with the power to fill a profound lack: 
 
‘Empathy is contagious, perhaps. That it’s seductive: if you’ve tasted, if you’ve 
sipped, from the cup of empathy, then you want more, because it’s good.’ LS 
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Accounts of the empathic ideal appeared to lack ambivalence; it was described as purely 
good and seemingly without complexity. Participants described a need to protect their 
ideal from corruption: 
 
‘I’d like to keep the territory of empathy as something wholly good, with wholly 
good intent… Again, I think we’re talking about forces that are bigger than what 
I would like to define as just empathy; I’d like to keep it in this little, kind of 
hallowed, sacred bubble, that’s not contaminated by these horrible realities, but 
clearly that’s a bit naive.’ LS 
 
Participants seemed to internalise the empathic ideal, and subsequently construct their 
own identities around it. The capacity to meet the needs of the client was particularly 
significant in this self-construct and was often articulated in ways that appeared to 
reflect a construction of the therapist as parent, and the client as child. For example, one 
participant constructed empathy as ‘kind of mother and a child thing’ (LS) in which a 
‘rich, healthy, empathic attunement’ (LS) was offered to the other. This suggested an 
empathic ideal of perfect symbiosis, in which there appeared to be no gap between 
therapist and client. In maintaining the ideal self-construct, it was as if the therapist was 
providing the client with an empathic understanding for the first time in the client’s life:  
 
‘So often people come who haven’t been properly listened to; haven’t been 
properly attuned to; haven’t been “got” on that sort of emotional level, and for 
somebody to know that somebody “gets it”, emotionally, is very powerful in 
itself.’ AD 
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‘Psychotherapy is sometimes compensatory attention for… you’re getting a little 
potentised version of someone being deeply in relationship with you to help heal 
any lack of that you might have had.’ GB 
 
One participant referred to ‘that sense of that you’re feeling it for them’ (MN), a 
powerful capacity to take on the other’s pain so that they did not have to face it. 
Participants’ accounts appeared at times to indicate a narcissistic pride in their 
therapeutic abilities: 
 
‘I think now, over the years, I realised that I’m actually more highly sensitised, 
physically, than most people, and there is a group that says there are “highly 
sensitive people” (laughs), and that's 20% of the population. And if those groups 
were correct, then I would certainly fall into that group.’ AT 
 
Another participant claimed that they were even able to empathise with other species: 
 
‘Can I have empathy with non-human subjects? And yes, of course. Can I have 
empathy beyond non-mammals? Well, why not?’ LS 
 
One participant encouraged their clients to idealise them, claiming that acknowledgment 
of not-knowing is undesirable: 
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‘You want the therapist you also can project a little bit of “expert” onto; you 
don't want a therapist to say “I know nothing”.’ PL 
 
This statement appeared to deny any gratification that the therapist might incur through 
being constructed as an ideal. Another participant suggested how she avoided emotions 
that challenged her ideal self-construct: 
 
‘I don’t want to be present with how I’m feeling about my client so I kind of 
withdraw and avoid the feeling of being in touch with my countertransference, 
“I can’t be this awful therapist that feels this way about my client”.’ JG 
 
AT reflected on how maintaining an idealised identity constructed around expertise 
required a lot of psychic energy, leaving her depleted: 
 
‘I think it can be a very isolating place to be, if you put yourself in the position 
of being an expert, but it's also a really straining place to be, because you've got 
to maintain that, and it takes a lot of energy to be there all the time, and doesn't 
allow for other aspects - the shades of grey - to come into your life, you just 
have to stand firm, and that's an exhausting position to be in.’ AT  
 
It seemed that through identifying with an empathic ideal, painful aspects of the 
participant’s experience such as need and lack could be excluded from their self-
construct, perhaps resurfacing in their constructions of their clients as enfeebled and 
vulnerable.  
168 
 
Struggling to remain separate 
Constructing empathy as a perfect understanding, as though there was no gap between 
self and other, seemed to lead some participants to experience their clients as both 
suffocating and intrusive, with the potential to annihilate their own sense of 
individuality and autonomy: 
 
‘I’m actually seeing you from what is essentially me. So it means being really 
open, but, you know, the danger of that is that it can be quite overwhelming.’ 
SM 
 
This fear of empathy as symbiosis was reflected in AT’s anxiety over ‘losing (her)self 
to the other person’ in ‘getting drawn into their vortex’, and was echoed by DM’s 
reflection on the overwhelming effect of the mother’s experience on the unborn child, 
who has no capacity to protest or put up a boundary: 
 
‘If you experience, maybe, being shaped — the embryological nervous system — 
being shaped in a womb space ….where you have to imagine all the emotions of 
the mother are filtered, constantly, through the prenate, who can’t—who doesn’t 
have the capacity yet, the cognitive capacity to say “hang on, this is just mum”, 
you know. The self-other system is a much more fluid system then.’ DM 
 
As being overwhelmed by another was deemed to be potentially catastrophic, 
participants seemed to experience a need to stop this from happening through 
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maintaining a degree of separation. Some participants appeared to focus on the 
construction of boundaries between self and other, and continually questioned whether 
an experience originated from, or belonged to, themselves or the client: 
  
‘So I think the more the psychotherapists are engaged in their own mindfulness 
practice, the more they will be able to watch their own process come and go, 
and be with the client’s process as it comes and go and perhaps most crucially, 
know the difference (laughs softly), know which is theirs and which isn’t.’ GB 
 
The boundary’s function for the therapist seemed to be in allowing them to retain a 
separate sense of identity and preventing this from becoming overwhelmed by the other. 
However, this need for separation and autonomy was in contrast to the idealised self, 
constructed as perfectly able to understand the other. PL explained how feeling the 
emotions of her client would reduce her therapeutic potency: ‘If I was feeling it myself 
I'd be probably not able to help’. This rationalisation appeared to enable her to construct 
the separation as being in her clients’ interest. This seemed to be a compromise that 
allowed the ideal self-construct to remain largely intact, while allowing the enfeebled 
other to obtain protection.  
It seemed aggression and separation were linked, with participants struggling to 
manage these feelings in relation to their clients. Many indicated anxieties that 
aggression and individuation would be harmful and destructive of the other. The 
tendency to deny the ‘horrible reality’ (LS) that empathy was more complex than an 
ideal indicated something of participant’s anxieties about relinquishing the ideal. DM 
suggested that acknowledging difference and separateness in the therapeutic 
relationship can involve a painful loss of the symbiotic fantasy: 
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‘That's the problem, when we speak of empathy, usually in many--it can kind of 
be a wishy-washy sweet sugar on top of you, yeah? it would be much nicer if we 
sat here and drank tea and put sugar on top of each other.’ DM 
 
Holding a different stance to the other was constructed as in some way dangerous, as it 
would entail a moving away from the symbiotic merging of empathy. Some participants 
reflected on how constructing empathy as ideal, and by extension themselves, as purely 
good and kind left little room for any of the therapist’s hostility towards their client: 
 
‘That’s right, so we’ve taught ourselves that, “oh, this is one place where this 
person won’t be met with harshness”. So, yeah, it’s a very tricky one.’ MN 
 
Many participants expressed guilt about the idea of separating from the client; it was as 
if any wish for individuation or expression of hostility had to be denied. One participant 
made what I interpreted as a slip, expressing a dominating aggression towards her 
colleagues: 
 
‘I'm a Yoga teacher, I'm also a mindfulness teacher trainer, I also do this one-
to-one work, I also own and manage other people--I don't own other people, I 
own the building and manage other people!’ AT 
 
Discussion 
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The category of Defending a fragile self outlined above was part of a grounded theory 
that also included the category of Trembling with the other. It is important to emphasise 
that these two ways of constructing empathy were intertwined, and that in presenting 
just the former here I do not mean to suggest it was of greater importance. 
In Defending a fragile self, a process of Identifying with an empathic ideal was 
central to participants’ constructions of empathy. Many participants constructed their 
therapeutic role as to provide an empathy that had not been offered earlier in the client’s 
life. This seemed to fit with Kohut’s (1984) observation that unmet childhood needs for 
empathy continue to surface throughout life, and that the client’s need for empathy 
would get activated in the transference. Participants seemed very comfortable inhabiting 
the role of the ideal caregiver who offered empathy as mirroring or merging; many 
appeared to identify with this role without reflecting on the inherent transference and 
countertransference dynamics. This was suggested by the way in which participants 
spoke of empathy as truly and perfectly understanding their clients as if there was no 
space between them. 
Participants’ apparent gratification from the role of the idealised provider of 
empathy seems to fit with Kernberg’s (1970/1986) observations around narcissism as 
the belief that “my ideal image… and my real self are one, and better than the ideal 
person whom I wanted to love me, so that I do not need anybody else anymore” (p.217). 
However, this identification with an ideal appeared to involve the creation of a false self 
(Winnicott, 1960) based around a capacity for empathy, which appeared to induce 
feelings of being powerful, special and without limits. Some participants spoke of being 
able to empathise with non-human species, or being much more sensitive than the 
average person. In Lacanian terms, participants seemed to be engaging in an imaginary 
identification with their clients (Lacan 1949/2006); in maintaining the comforting 
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illusion that self and other are the same (“that sense that you’re feeling it for them”, 
MN), the otherness of the client was denied. 
Through identifying with this empathic ideal, it seemed that participants were at 
times using their clients as self-objects to stabilise their own sense of identity. This 
suggested that participants’ own narcissistic needs may have been emerging in their 
therapeutic relationships, leading them to seek mirroring and idealisation from their 
clients. I wondered if participants had difficulty integrating their own grandiosity with 
their vulnerability (Kohut, 1984), and that their sense of self may have been constructed 
around an ideal or abstraction rather than a fallible, embodied human being with needs 
that may be gratified or frustrated (Winnicott, 1960). This would fit with research that 
suggests therapists may exhibit a higher degree of narcissistic injury than non-therapists 
(Halewood & Tribe, 2003) and that taking on the role of a therapist can perhaps be an 
attempt to vicariously meet one’s own narcissistic needs (Menninger, 1957).  
Perhaps unsurprisingly in the light of this suggestion, it was less common for 
participants to describe the times they failed to meet their clients’ empathic needs. 
Kohut (1971/2009) emphasises the importance of moments when the therapist is unable 
to empathise with their client, requiring the client to learn to provide for themselves the 
empathy they need in a “transmuting internalisation” (p.74). Here the client’s sense of 
self is effectively built up and stabilised through encountering a degree of 
disappointment and frustration that can be tolerated. It seemed that for participants such 
a process of failing to meet the clients’ needs might have been quite threatening to their 
own self-constructs. Alongside idealising the self, it also seemed as though the 
disavowed aspects of the self were projected on to the client who at times was 
constructed as weak and lacking. These tendencies towards idealising the self and 
enfeebling the other implied a split in which the participants got rid of the “bad” aspects 
of themselves by attributing them to the client; a process akin to Klein’s (1952) 
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mechanism of projective identification. This suggests that participants may have been 
struggling to integrate both good and bad aspects into their self-construct. Constructions 
of empathy in the category Defending a fragile self therefore seemed to involve the 
therapist’s disavowal of their own vulnerability and projection of this onto (and perhaps 
into) their clients. This would seem to support the suggestion that empathy is a form of 
projective identification (Klein, 1955/1997; Hinshelwood, 1989) in which the self is 
projected into the other in order to understand their experience as if from within.  
However, this idealised empathy seemed to bring up a fear of “losing (one)self 
to the other person” (AT), an annihilation of personal autonomy through merger with 
the other. In the face of this, participants indicated that they were Struggling to remain 
separate. This need to take a separate stance is perhaps important for the therapist in 
being able to offer the client a new perspective. The capacity for separation has been 
linked with aggression; as Winnicott (1971) writes, “If the child is to become an adult, 
then this move is achieved over the dead body of an adult” (p.145). Johnson (1994) 
suggests that a persistent pattern of taking responsibility for the emotions of the other 
can mean finding a false sense of self which disallows expressions of autonomy and 
aggression. Participants seemed to struggle with the acknowledgement of any 
aggression in the clinical encounter, as “we’ve taught ourselves that, oh, this this is one 
place where this person won’t be met with harshness” (MN).  
This suggestion of disavowed aggression fits with Safouan’s (1980) argument 
that Kohut’s self psychology approach leads analysts to narcissistically create ideal 
images of themselves as devoted helpers, a construction which allows them to ignore 
their own sadism. Johnson (1994) argues that hostility accumulates when someone gets 
drawn into a symbiotic relationship with little space for their own autonomy, and as this 
hostility can’t be expressed outright it can build up or get expressed passively. Perhaps 
this disavowed aggression represents the “shadow side” of empathy (LS), the hostility 
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that arises as a consequence of emotionally merging with the other in the process of 
empathy. This may partly explain why participants appeared to be very concerned with 
the construction of professional boundaries, the preoccupation with determining 
whether a particular emotional experience belonged to self and other, and moving into a 
detached, observing stance at times by focusing on the breath and the experience of the 
body. These attempts to focus awareness on the boundaries of the self and away from 
the client suggest that the practice of meditation has the potential to be used as a defence 
against being overwhelmed by the other, a means of shoring up a fragile self. 
 
 
Limitations and critique 
One criticism of this study could be that in my failure to transcribe or code for emotion 
in voice, length of pauses or level of intelligibility, I was limited in what meaning could 
be constructed. As Lacan (1956/2006) suggests, “May one of your ears become as deaf 
as the other one must be acute. And that is the one that you should lend to listen for 
sounds and phonemes, words, locutions, and sentences, not forgetting pauses, scansions, 
cuts, periods and parallelisms” (p.394). I coded the contents of my participants’ speech 
and actions, but did not pay as much attention to the particularities of how they spoke or 
the spaces between words. This is arguably problematic as it precludes some aspects of 
participants’ experience from the analysis. This meant that I lost the opportunity to 
construct an understanding more deeply rooted in the symbolic, with a greater potential 
for picking up and making sense of unconscious material. In a paper making 
connections between Lacanian psychoanalysis and qualitative research, Vanheule 
(2002) asserts that a symbolic relationship with data must be cultivated which maintains 
the focus on the signifiers and the relationships between signifiers. In order to bring into 
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focus such subtleties of meaning, a careful and discerning approach is required. Seale 
and Silverman (1997) for example recommend transcribing interviews in a manner 
informed by conversation analysis, arguing that doing so can offer the opportunity to 
find radically different meanings and bring greater reliability and validity to research. 
Moss and Barnes (2008) treat their qualitative data as “footprints”, which they suggest 
are “the passing trace of something live, a trace of a moment that has already passed, 
beyond grasping, intangible” (p.18). This way of engaging with data expresses a 
mindful approach to research, through which nothing is fully fixed or tangible, but 
rather vividly fluctuating.  
Although at least partially addressed with ongoing researcher reflexivity, over-
identifying with my participants was a potential issue I faced. Akin to an over-
identification in the countertransference (e.g. Eleftheriadou, 1999), such a concern 
needs serious consideration. Vanheule (2002) suggests that the researcher’s desire 
(perhaps for knowledge) can result in an imaginary relationship with their data 
characterised by illusion, the fascinating mirror from which a deluded identity is 
formed. Rizq (2008) suggests that the process of identifying with the participant’s 
vulnerability and the subsequent narcissistic dynamic of mutual agreement may mean 
that the researcher’s guilty and anxious feelings about difference and conflict are 
repressed. This unconscious conflict could result in the researcher feeling resistance to 
the analysis and dissemination phases of their research process or a taking a sterile and 
conflict-free descriptive rather than interpretative approach to engaging with their data. 
This was something I struggled with at times, as taking an interpretative stance felt 
imbued with aggression, and I can only hope that through making use of supervision 
and memo-writing processes I was able to sufficiently separate from my data to say 
something new. This process seemed to mirror participants’ struggle to remain separate 
and the pull towards an empathy with no gap between self and other. 
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Implications 
The grounded theory outlined above indicates that the practices of meditation and 
psychotherapy do not inherently lead to freedom from narcissism and defensiveness. 
Participants seem to maintain an idealised self-construct based around their capacity for 
empathy. The danger perhaps could be that when participants unquestioningly assume 
that they are capable of providing their clients with an ideal form of empathy, it could 
potentially perpetuate a collusive transference and countertransference dynamic that 
prevents the client from moving forward. What might be particularly problematic is if 
this defensiveness remains unconscious. The implications of this are that therapists may 
be acting out on their own unmet needs in their choice of career and unconsciously 
attempting to meet those needs in their relationships with their clients. The way in 
which participants spoke much more about their strong capacities for empathy than their 
moments of empathic failure implied that the focus was more on gratifying the client, 
and less on empowering the client to learn how to meet their own needs. This will have 
been influenced by the power dynamics in the interview between participants and 
myself, and it’s possible that this resulted in a greater level of defensiveness than in 
their relationships with clients. However, it may also suggest that the client’s attempts 
to separate or express aggression towards their therapist were not adequately mirrored. 
Hardy (1979) suggested that this can result in denying the client’s independence, 
misunderstanding the client and discouraging a negative transference. It would be 
difficult to really understand the other from a place of idealised symbiosis and 
omnipotence, as the client may need the therapist to feel empty, impotent, and devalued 
in the countertransference. If the therapist is defended against these feelings, they will 
remain unconscious and thus unavailable for thinking and talking about with the client.   
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 Perhaps Defending a fragile self relates to the concept of compassion fatigue, 
which Figley (2002) suggested is the cost of empathically engaging with others in the 
helping profession. Defending a fragile self seemed to require participants to expend a 
great deal of psychic energy, apparently in maintaining the identification with an ideal 
and in struggling to remain separate. It would not be a great leap to suggest that this 
could lead eventually to therapists becoming depleted and burnt out. 
 This study also has implications for grounded theory methods. The unconscious 
tends not to be acknowledged in grounded theory research, perhaps because it seems to 
imply essentialism and moving beyond the data. However, this can be avoided by 
acknowledging the unconscious itself to be a theoretical construct, albeit one with a 
profound power to open up new meanings. I would argue that it is useful to have 
unconscious motivations in mind when conducting grounded theory research, as these 
are likely to influence the constructions which develop in the research process. Leaving 
the unconscious out of our theoretical constructions leads us to ignore the instances in 
which participants contradict themselves, make slips or in other ways reveal “the 
strangeness buried in ordinary thought and language, an eerie otherness that daily 
speech conceals” (Cohen, 2013, p.24). In paying close attention to what participants are 
saying, to their actions, and to this eerie otherness woven through their words, we can 
begin to construct understandings with much greater richness and depth. This deeper 
level of analysis would make grounded theory a particularly appropriate method for 
psychoanalytic research. 
 
Recommendations for practice and future research 
The findings of the current study indicate the dangers of unidentified narcissistic 
defences in clinical work. It seems important for therapists to be aware of defensively 
178 
identifying with an ideal, as well as the tendency to create an enfeebled other. 
Therapists might benefit from reflecting on the narcissistic needs which can 
unconsciously drive their therapeutic relationships. Bringing these needs into 
awareness, reducing shame about them, and finding ways of talking about these issues 
is vital for ethical practice. This research suggests that personal therapy during training 
and regular meditation practice may not be sufficient to alert therapists to their own 
narcissism. Perhaps the therapists of trainee therapists should be selected at least 
partially on their experience and training in working with issues of narcissism. 
Furthermore, if even after training therapists are unconsciously driven in their practice 
by narcissistic needs, there must be opportunities for these needs to be explored and at 
least partially met in settings outside of relationships with clients.  
Investigating the potential link between Defending a fragile self and compassion 
fatigue (e.g. Figley, 2002) would be valuable to better understand the conditions which 
can lead therapists to experience depletion and burnout. This could mean exploring the 
experiences of therapists who identify as compassion fatigued within the context of the 
categories constructed in the present study. If more evidence accrues for such a 
connection, it would lead to practical recommendations.  
 
Conclusion 
It seemed that participants’ constructions of empathy were partially rooted in Defending 
a fragile self. I hope that this theoretical construction might challenge the assumptions 
around what it means to empathise, and stimulate thought about the hidden motivations 
and needs that seem to be bound inextricably with empathy. These needs seem not to 
disappear with time, but rather require honest and open reflection. While not explored in 
this article, therapists that practiced mindfulness described another way of constructing 
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empathy: a Trembling with the other that was not rooted in projective identification but 
rather an acknowledgement of lack, a profound sense of interconnectedness and a 
meeting of the unknown. Navigating an ever-shifting balance between this and 
Defending a fragile self seems to be the path of the mindful therapist. 
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